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Abstract
The new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) will take effect in May 2018, and
hence, designing compliant data protection policies and system architectures became crucial
for organizations to avoid penalties. Unfortunately, the regulations given in a textual for-
mat can be easily misinterpreted by the policy and system designers, which also making the
conformance check error-prone for auditors. In this paper, we apply formal approach to fa-
cilitate systematic design of policies and architectures in an unambiguous way, and provide a
framework for mathematically sound conformance checks against the current data protection
regulations. We propose a (semi-)formal approach for specifying and reasoning about data
protection policies and architectures as well as defining conformance between architectures
and policies. The usability of our proposed approach is demonstrated on a smart metering
service.
1 Introduction
Under the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC [15], the Data Protection Act 1998 [27], and the
new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [17], personal data is defined as “any information
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person”. The data protection regulations contain
rights for living individuals who have their data processed (i.e., rights for the data subjects),
and enforce responsibilities for the data controllers and the data processors who store, process
or transmit such data [15]. In the USA, personally identifiable information (PII) is used with a
similar interpretation to personal data in Europe [12].
Unfortunately, despite the mandatory data protection regulations, there were a huge number
of data breach incidents in the past [10,21,23,30–32] and nowadays, such as the recent Cambridge
Analytica scandal of Facebook [4], where personal data of more than 87 millions Facebook users
has been collected and used for advertising and election campaign purposes without a clear data
usage consent. One of the main problems was the insufficient check by Facebook on the third
party applications. The UK based telecommunication company, TalkTalk, has been reported
being penalised several times for failing to protect appropriately customers’ data, and put around
21,000 customers’ details at risk in the past [3]. Google also faced lawsuit over collecting personal
data without permission several times, and has been reported to illegally gathered the personal
data of millions of iPhone users in the UK in one of the recent news [2].
Strengthening the protection of personal data as well as increasing transparency are among
some of the main goals of the new General Data Protection regulations that replaces the Data Pro-
tection Directive 95/46/EC. Privacy by design is becoming a legal obligation for service providers
under the Article 25 of the GDPR [13], which requires the design of data protection and control
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into the development of business processes for service providers. According to the BBC news [1] in
2014, the new data protection proposals include a clause to prevent European data being shared
with another country, as well as providing rights and means for citizens to erase their personal data.
The regulation also attempts to limit businesses from performing user profiling and demanding
appropriate consents before personal data collection (see the Article 7 of the GDPR) [14].
As the GDPR comes into play in May 2018, numerous summits, conferences and workshops
have been organised by data protection bodies to help business and organisations with preparing
for the compliant policy and system design. One of the main problems system designers have
to face is that regulations given in the textual format is easy to be misinterpreted and, hence,
increasing the chance of error in both the designing and auditing phases.
Some applications based on questionnaires with a huge number of informal questions (e.g.,
Simplexxy1) help the policy and system designers to check if their system is compliant with the
GDPR, but this still provides only informal hints and directions, instead of helping with system
design in an unambiguous way. They do not facilitate any automated reasoning about the data
protection properties (e.g., whether a given entity can have a given data based on a policy).
From the technical perspective, to the best of our knowledge, only a very limited number of
works can be found in the literature that investigate the formal model or systematic method to
design privacy policies and architectures, as well as facilitate compliance check of existing services
with the current data protection rules. The main advantage of using formal approaches during the
system design is that the compliance with the regulations can be confirmed based on mathematical
proofs, unlike the error-prone informal reasoning.
We propose a variant of semi-formal policy language for specifying data protection policies in
a compact way, and semantics with compliance rules for reasoning about different data protection
properties of the policy. Furthermore, we also propose a variant of architecture language, with
which system architectures can specified and the data protection properties can be analysed.
Finally, we define different mappings and conformance relations between the system architectures
and policies. Based on a smart metering service case study, we also demonstrate the usability of
our proposed languages. This work is a modified and improved version of our preprint report first
published on Arxiv in 2015 [33]. The main difference between this paper and [33] is that here we
mainly concentrate on the data protection properties, while in [33], we investigated the dynamic
nature of policies to model data control rules changing over time (e.g., when the Facebook users
change their friend lists, the data control policy will change).
2 Contributions and Challenges
In the following, we provide the main contributions of this paper in Section 2.1, then we discuss
the main challenges in Section 2.2.
2.1 Contributions
Addressing the problems discussed in Section 1, this paper proposes a policy and an architec-
ture language for specifying and reasoning about data protection requirements. Our idea and
contributions are depicted in the Fig. 1.
Our first contribution (Section 5) is the proposed policy language that enables us to encode
the data protection regulations in a more compact and unambigous form. Our policy languague is
a variant of the language proposed by Ta and Butin et al. [8,35], however, it is more generic than
that, because it is crafted for capturing the whole data life-cycle with different syntax, semantics
and new definitions and compliance rules. This can help the policy designers to verify if their
policy is in compliance with the current regulations. We can also verify which entities can have a
given personal data based on the policy.
Our second contribution (Section 6) is a lower level architecture language for specifying and
reasoning about system architectures. Again, our language is inspired by the works by Ta and
1bbj.hu/business/software-offers-help-as-gdpr-compliance-deadline-looms_148061
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Figure 1: An overview and the intuition behind the contributions of this paper.
Antignac et al. [6, 34], but specifically designed for data protection regulations with different
syntax, semantics, definitions and deduction rules to check certain data protection properties. We
will discuss the differences in more details in the Section 3.
Our third main contribution (Section 7) is a mapping procedure between the policy and ar-
chitecture levels. In particular, with new definitions, properties and propositions we also provide
different conformance checks between the specified architectures and policies. To the best of our
knowledge this has not been investigated and proposed before. In one of our previous works [34], we
have investigated the mapping and conformance check between system architectures and concrete
system implementations.
Finally, in a case study (Section 8) we demonstrate the usage of our languages for defining
and analysing a data protection policy and architecture of a smart metering service, as well as the
conformance checks between them.
2.2 Challenges
The biggest challenge we have to have to face in this paper beside defining an correct syntax and
semantics for the languages, is how to find a mapping and conformance relations between a higher
level (i.e. more abstract) policy and a lower level system architecture. The main novelty in this
work compared to the previous work is that here we specifically crafted the policy and architecture
languages syntax and semantics in such a way that appropriate mappings can be defined between
a data protection (DPR) policy and an architecture, as well as facilitating conformance checks
between the two levels.
3 Related Works vs. Our Work
There are numerous policy languages for modelling privacy, security and access control properties
of different systems in the past. For instance, the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) [38] was
an attempt to enable web users to gain control over their private information on online services.
In particular, it enables websites to express their privacy practices in a standard format that can
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be retrieved automatically and interpreted easily by web client applications. Users will be notified
about certain website’s privacy policies and have a chance to make decision on that. To match
and check the privacy preferences of users and web services, the Working Group also proposed
a P3P Preference Exchange Language (APPEL) [39] integrated into the web clients, with which
the user can express their privacy preferences that can be matched against the practices set by
the online services. While the idea was nice, there were several weaknesses, such as the ineffective
interactions between P3P and APPEL. According to [5], in APPEL, users can only specify what
is unacceptable in a policy, and simple preferences are hard to express and error prone. Idenfying
this, the authors in [5] proposed a better preference language called XPref giving more freedom
for the users, such as allowing acceptable preferences.
The main differences between these works and our work is that P3P, APPEL, and XPref
are mainly designed for web applications/services, and the policies are defined in a XML-based
language, with resticted options for the users. Our work is based on formal languages with more
generic syntax and semantics, mathematical definitions and proofs, making it applicable for any
type of services.
Another XML-based policy language is the Customer Profile Exchange (CPEcxchange) [24],
which was designed to facilitate business-to-business communication privacy policies (i.e., privacy-
enabled global exchange of customer profile information). The eXtensible Access Control Markup
Language (XACML) [26] is a de-facto, XML-based policy language, specifically designed for access
control management in distributed systems. The latest version 3.0 was approved by the OASIS
standards organization as an international standard on July 2017. Finally, the Enterprise Privacy
Authorisation Language (EPAL) of IBM [28] was designed to regulate an organisation’s internal
privacy policies. EPAL is partly similar to XACML, however, it mainly focuses on privacy policies
instead of access control policies in XACML.
A-PPL [7] is an accountability policy language specifically designed for modelling data account-
ability (such as data retention, data location, logging and notification) in the cloud. A-PPL is an
extension of the the PrimeLife Privacy Policy Language (PPL) [40], which enables specification
of access and usage control rules for the data subjects and the data controller. PPL is built upon
XACML, and allows us to define the so-called sticky policies on personal data based on obliga-
tions. Obligation defines whether the policy language can trigger tasks that must be performed,
once some event occurs and the related condition is fulfilled. This is also referred to as the Event-
Action-Condition paradigm. The Policy Description Language (PDL) [25], proposed by Bell Labs,
is one of the first policy-based management languages, specifically for network administration. It
is declarative and is based on the Event-Action-Condition paradigm similar to the PPL language.
RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) [29] is onw of the most broadly-known role-based access
control policy languages. It uses roles and permissions in the enforced policies, namely, a subject
can be assigned roles, and roles can be assigned certain access control permissions. ASL (Autho-
rization Specification Language) [20] is an another Role-based access control language based on
first order logic, and RBAC components. Ponder [11] is a declarative and object-oriented policy
language, and designed for defining and modelling security policies using Role-Based Access Con-
trol, and security management policies for distributed systems. The policies are defined on roles
or group of roles. Rei [22] is a policy language based on deontic logic, designed mainly for mod-
elling security and privacy properties of pervasive computing environments. It’s syntax involves
obligation and permission, where policies are defined as constraints over pemitted and obligated
actions on resources.
To date, formal approaches that support modelling and analysing data protection requirements
(e.g., GDPR) are less investigated. Some attempts on formalizing privacy and accountability
policies and privacy architectures have been made, such as in [8, 35] and [6, 34]. In [8], a formal
privacy policy language was proposed that defines, for each type of personal data, authorised
purposes, deletion delays, request completion delays, admissible contexts and data forwarding
policies. Trace compliance properties were defined with respect to data handling events and
elements of these privacy policies. The correctness properties relating to personal data handling
events and system events was also formalized. In [35], we modified to the policy language in [8],
and provided its first application on a real-world biometrics surveillance system as a case study.
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This paper is inspired by these previous works, however, the proposed policy language is more
generic, fine-grained and address the data protection requirements on the whole data life-cycle,
namely, (i) data collection, (ii) data storage, (iii) data usage, (iv) data forwarding/transfer, and
(v) data deletion/retention [9]. To the best of our knowledge this has not been proposed yet
in the literature. We changed the syntax and semantics elements, along with the corresponding
compliance rules and introduce new definitions. As a result, the policy language proposed in
this paper is capable of capturing the policy of more complex systems, compared to the previous
approaches. For instance, in [8] there is no possibility to specify a sub-policy for data storage.
Our proposed architecture language is a modified and extended version of the one in [6], where
the authors addressed the problem of privacy-by-design at the architecture level and proposed a
formal approach that facilitates architecture design. In particular, they provided the idea of the
architecture language and logic, a dedicated variant of epistemic logics [12], to deal with different
aspects of privacy. Basically, an architecture is defined as a set of architecture relations, which
capture the computation and communication abilities of each component. For instance, a relation
computei(x = t) specifies that a component Ci can compute a value t for the variable x. The
proposed language mainly focuses on the computation and integrity verification of data based on
trust relations. Unlike [6], our proposed language focuses primary on data protection regulations,
rather than the data integrity perspective. Our language variant proposed in this paper has a more
expressive and different syntax and semantics, as well as novel data protection (DPR) compliance
rules, mapping and conformance checks between the architecture and policy levels, which are not
given in [6].
4 Data Protection Regulation on the End-to-End Data Life-
cycle
End-to-end personal data protection should cover the whole data life-cycle [9]. Following this, our
proposed privacy language enables a fine-grained policy specification on the entire data life-cycle,
namely, data collection, storage, usage, deletion, and forwarding.
• Data collection: An important aspect data controllers should follow during personal data
collection is data minimisation. The 3rd principle of the current data protection regulation
says that data controllers should identify the minimum amount of personal data they need to
fulfill their purposes [19]. Personal data that are not required for the purpose of the services,
should not be collected [9]. In addition, data controllers should define and declare (i) the
purpose of the data collection during, e.g., the registration phase, (ii) what kind of data is
collected from users, as well as (iii) ensure that consent is collected from the users whenever
required (e.g., for certain type of personal data). Finally, (iv) records (logs) about the data
collection procedure should be kept by data controllers.
• Data usage: Data controllers should specify and maintain an unambiguous data usage/processing
policy [9, 37]. The policy should contain details about (i) who can use the given data and
(ii) for what purpose. The purpose of usage should be aligned with the purpose of data
collection. Further, the (iii) time period for data usage should be specified.
• Data storage: A clear data storage policy should be maintain and declared. The policy
should include [9, 15, 16] (i) where a certain type of particular data is stored, (ii) how a
certain type of data is stored, and (iii) how long a particular type of data is stored, and
(iv) mechanisms are required for the periodic review of the need of storing the particular
personal data.
• Data deletion/retention: Under the Article 17 of the GDPR [18] individuals have the right
to have personal data erased. This is known as the ’right to be forgotten’. Data controllers
should define and declare a precise data deletion policy which specifies (i) who can delete
certain type of data, (ii) how the data is deleted (deletion mode, such as deleted from all
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storage or only partly deleted, as well as has a deletion request has been sent to any third
party company to whom the data have been forward), (iii) what is the retention delay, and
(iv) the worst-case (global) deletion delay.
• Data forwarding: Data forwarding (transfer) policy should be defined [9, 15], which include
(i) a list of third party companies or authorities to whom the data will be forwarded, (ii)
the purpose of data forwarding, and (iii) the logs/records of the data forwarding procedure.
• Transparency is an another fundamental requirement in the EU Personal Data Protection
Regulation (e.g., Articles 10 and 11 of Directive 95/46/EC) [15, 36], which basically says
that privacy notices and information about the data collection should be made available to
the customers.
5 PDC : A Policy Language for Data Protection
We propose a high-level privacy policy language (called PDC) to specify and reason about the
data protection requirements. The data subjects in our model are system users whose personal
data has been collected by the data controller or input to the system by either the data sub-
ject or someone else (e.g., meter reading). The data controllers and data processors are service
providers/organisations who collect, calculate/process and use the personal data about the data
subjects. For simplicity, in this paper, we merge and use interchange the data controller and data
processor, while in real life they can be two different entities2.
The proposed policy language captures the sub-policies defined on the entire data life-cycle.
Policy designers can use our language to define their data collection, usage, storage, deletion/retention,
and forwarding sub-policies.
5.1 Policy Syntax
The policy specification concept is based on our previous work [35], but with the modified and
extended (more expressive) syntax and semantics elements, crafted for handling personal data
protection properties. Our language can be adapted by any type of data controller, however, for
simplicity, in the following, let us refer to a data controller as service provider. A service provider
SP has a finite set of n different services, PServicesSPPL = {serv1, . . . , servn}, the corresponding
finite set of all data types required by the n services, TYPESPPL = {θ1, . . . , θm}, as well as the
finite set of different entities, EntitySPPL = {sp, . . . , ow, or, tar, . . . , i, j} defined in the system of
SP .
Let CD be a set of all the possible finite sets of collected data, and cd ∈ CD. A data dt ∈ cd
is defined as the tuple (ow, ds, θ), where ow ∈ EntitySPPL is the owner of the data who inputs this
data into the system3, ds ∈ EntitySPPL specifies a data subject included in this data, θ in TYPESPPL
is the type. We note that in our model the tuple (ow, ds, θ) remains unchanged during the system
run.
In the following, we define a set of data protection policies on the entire data life-cycle (data
collection, usage, storage, deletion, and forwarding).
Definition 1 (Data Protection Policy). The syntax of the data protection policies are defined as
the following tuples:
We define the set of high-level data protection policies (POL), which are composed of the
five sub-policies based on the end-to-end data life-cycle. Namely, the sets of data collection
(PolCol), data usage (PolUse), data storage (PolStr), data deletion (PolDel), data forwarding
policies (PolFw).
2Note that in the new GDPR the role and responsibility of the data processor will be more relevant than the
data controller was in the old DPR
3In our model, for each data there is only one ow who inputs this data into the system (e.g., uploads a photo or
submit a name), the user who obtains the data during the system run is not considered as ow.
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1. POL = PolCol × PolUse × PolStr × PolDel × PolFw.
2. PolCol = Conscol × CPurp.
3. PolUse = Consuse × UPurp × WhoUse.
4. PolStr = Wst × Hst × RDatest.
5. PolDel = Whodel × Howdel × Retdel × Globaldel.
6. PolFw = Purpfw × List3rd.
Data collection policy includes consent required (Conscol) for certain data types (e.g., personal
data) and collection purposes (CPurp). Data usage policy specifies the consent (Consuse) of data
usage for some data types (e.g., personal data), the purpose of data usage (UPurp), and the set of
entities who are allowed to use the data (WhoUse). Data storage policy specifies where the data is
stored (Wst), how the data is stored (Hst), and the date for reviewing the necessity of storing the
data further (RDatest). The data deletion policy specifies who can delete the data (Whodel), how
the data is deleted (Howdel), the retention period (Retdel), and the global (worst-case) deletion
delay (Globaldel). Finally, the data forwarding policy involves the purpose of the data forwarding
(Purpfw), and all the third party entities to which the data will be forwarded (List3rd).
Each data protection policy is defined on a data type (θ), specifically, let piθ, piθ ∈ POL, be
a policy defined on a data type θ, and the five sub-policies picol ∈ PolCol, piuse ∈ PolUse, pistr ∈
PolStr, pidel ∈ PolDel, pifw ∈ PolFw, where
piθ = (picol, piuse, pistr, pidel, pifw),
and each sub-policy of θ is defined as follows:
1. picol = (cons, cpurp), with cons ∈ {Y , N}. This specifies that if a consent is required to
be collected from users (Y for Yes) or not (N for No) for this type of data, and cpurp =
(purpsetc, decl), where purpsetc is a set of collection purposes, as well as decl ∈ {Y , N}.
decl specifies if the collection purposes is declared for the users (visibility), which again, can
take the value of Y (Yes) or N (No). Finally, purposes can be strings that uniquely define
the purpose.
In the sequel, we discuss some further requirements for data collection.
• Data Minimisation: Given a service provider, the data collection purposes are usually
determined by the services available tocustomers after the registration phase. Data
minimisation depends strongly on the purposes of the data collection. For a given
service provider, let the set of purposes of data collection be cpurp ∈ CPurp, and
pservicese ∈ ServicesSPPL be the set of all functions/procedures required by the services
chosen by an entity e. Ideally, in strict term, we have the constraint cpurp ⊆ pservicese,
which basically says that the data collection purposes are to enable the entity e to use
its chosen services.
• Data types to be collected: Let typecole be a set of collected data types by a given
service provider from user e. Also, let typeservU be the set of data types required by
the services chosen by U . In an ideal case, the service provider should collect only the
data of types required by the services chosen by U , namely, we have the constraint
typecolU ⊆ typeservU .
• Consent: For a given service provider and user U let constypeU be a set of data types
that requires consent for collection (e.g., sensitive data in case of health-care services),
we have constypeU ⊆ typecolU .
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• Transparency: Information about the data collection and usage purposes, as well as
information about the data storage, deletion and forwarding should be available tocus-
tomers/users. Transparency is captured by the variable decl (declaration) in the policy
language syntax.
2. piuse = (cons, upurp, whouse), with policy for consent collection, cons ∈ {Y , N}, and policy
for usage purposes, upurp = (purpsetu, decl), where purpsetu is a set of usage purposes, and
decl ∈ {Y , N} is similar to above. Finally, the policy on who can use the data, whouse =
(who, decl), where who is a set of entities who are allowed to use the data.
3. pistr = (wh, ho, revdate), with
• wh is a set of places where the data dt is stored, for instance, in a client computer
(clientloc) or in the service provider’s (sploc) servers, namely, wh ∈ {(clientloc, places,
decl), (sploc, places, decl)}, where places is a set of places where the data will be stored.
Again, decl specifies the declaration of this information for users.
• ho is a set of methods in which the data dt is stored, for example, in hidden (hidden) or
non-hidden (nohidden) forms. Hidden form means that the data should not be read by
the service provider, while non-hidden form means that it can be available in plaintext
for the service provider. For example, in the first case, the data can be encrypted using
the key not available to the service provider, while in the latter case, the data can be
stored encrypted with the service provider’s key, or in plaintext. Namely, we have ho
∈ {(hidden, decl), (nohidden, decl)}.
• revdate is the date for periodic review of the need of storage of the data dt in certain
places, namely, revdate = (date, places, decl), where date is a time interval within which
the review has to be done.
• decl ∈ {Y , N}.
4. pidel = (how, deld, gdeld), with
• how defines the deletion approaches for this type of data. and how = ({p1, p2}, decl),
where p1 ∈ {aut, man}, p2 ∈ {full, (partly, purposes)}. Parameter p1 can be aut which
refers to the automated deletion mode, initiated automatically by the service provider,
for instance, the deletion delay after some certain pre-defined events. man refers to a
manual deletion initiated by a user. Parameter p2 captures whether the data is fully
deleted, namely, deleted from all the main or backup servers.
• deld = (dd, decl) represents the delay for the deletion after the initiation (e.g., when a
user has clicked on a delete button, or a user has unregistered from the service). The
value of this delay can be ND, refers to “Not Defined”, or a certain time period (e.g.,
1 day, 1 min, 1 sec, etc.), or DF which refers to “Defined-without a specific numerical
time frame” (e.g., DF can be “until required for the services").
• gdeld = (gd, decl), where gd is a global (worst-case) deletion delay within which the
data should be deleted after the customer/client unregister from the service. gd can
be a numerical value (e.g., 5 years, 1 hour, etc), or ND and DF for “Not Defined" and
“Defined without a specific numerical time frame", respectively.
• decl ∈ {Y , N}.
5. pifw = (cons, fwpurp, 3rdparty), where cons captures if consent is required or not, fwpurp is a
set of purposes of data forwarding, 3rdparty is a set of third party authorities and companies
to whom the data has been forwarded.
Finally, let us assume a finite set {θ1, . . . , θm} of all data types supported by the service of a
given provider SP .
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Then, the default data protection (DPR) policy for SP is defined by
the set
PL = {piθ1 , . . . , piθm}.
5.2 Policy Semantics
5.2.1 Abstract Events
To reason about the system operation and its compliance with a given DPR policy we introduce
abstract events [35]. Each abstract event captures an activity that happens during the system run.
These events are abstract, because they specify high-level actions happening during the system
operation, ignoring the low-level system internals such as writing to a memory space (e.g., at the
system log level) or the protocol level (e.g., a concrete implementation of the system).
Events are defined by the tuples starting with an event name capturing the activity carried
out by different entities, followed by the time of the event, and further parameters required by
that activity.
Our language includes the pre-defined activities own, register, store, storerev, collect, cconsent,
uconsent, fwconsent, declare, use, deletereq, mandelete, autdelete, forward, and register which are
related to the data protection regulation. For each data dt defined by the tuple of (ow, ds, θ) and
piθ, we have the following events:
Ev1 : (own, t, or, θ, v)
Ev2 : (register, t, or, pservices, typeserv)
Ev3 : (store, t, or, θ, v, places)
Ev4 : (storerev, t, sp, θ, v, places)
Ev5 : (collect, t, sp, or, θ, v, purposes)
Ev6 : (cconsent, t, sp, tar, θ, v, purposes, piθ)
Ev7 : (uconsent, t, sp, tar, θ, v, purposes, piθ)
Ev8 : (fwconsent, t, sp, tar, θ, v, purposes, piθ)
Ev9 : (declare, t, sp, tar, θ, v, params, piθ)
Ev10 : (use, t, or, θ, v, purposes, bywhom)
Ev11 : (deletereq, t, or, θ, v, piθ)
Ev12 : (mandelete, t, or, θ, v, places, piθ)
Ev13 : (autdelete, t, sp, θ, v, places, piθ)
Ev14 : (forward, t, sp, or, θ, v, purposes, towhom, piθ)
Ev15 : (unregister, t, or, pservices, typeserv)
In the sequel, we refer to each element e of a tuple tup as tup.e, for example, we can refer to
pistr in piθ as piθ.pistr. Event own captures the fact that the data of type θ and value v is initially
owned (possessed) by or. Event store specifies that the data of type θ and value v is stored at
the places places. Event storerev captures when a periodic review has been done at time t about
whether data dt should be stored further at the places places.
Event collect specifies the event when the data of type θ and value v has been collected by the
service provider sp from entity or at time t, for the purposes purposes. Event cconsent specifies
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when consent required for the data collection purposes purposes for data the data of type θ and
value v has been collected from the entity tar at time t (i.e., the customer/user gived consent to
the service provider) according to the policy piθ. Event uconsent captures when consent has been
collected by the service provider at time t for the data usage purposes purposes. Event fwconsent
is similar to the previous two events but related to data forwarding instead.
Event declare captures the event when certain set of parameters params of policy a piθ, have
been declared at time t according to the policy piθ. It specifies the declaration of every parameter
p, p ∈ params, e.g., when p = fwpurp in pifw (i.e., p = piθ.pifw.fwpurp). We note that consent
collection and declaration of the two sets purposes and params, normally happen only once during
the data collection phase. The event use captures that the data of type θ and value v collected
from or has been used by entities in the set bywhom at the time t for certain purposes purposes.
In deletereq the customer/client or (or 6= sp) initiates the request towards the service provider
(e.g., when a user clicks on the deletion button or the unregister/deactivate account button) from
user or at time t to delete the data of type θ and value v. Note that in these cases, deletereq only
takes place when manual deletion mode is active (i.e., piθ.pidel.how.p1 = man) and when the data
is stored at the service provider’s location, or has been forwarded to the third parties.
The event mandelete captures the fact that the data of type θ and value v is deleted by or
at time t. This can happen either by a client (e.g., when the data is stored locally at the client
side), or it can be done by the service provider after the delete request has been sent by the user
(i.e., this time or can be either client or service provider). Event autdelete refers to the automated
deletion by the service provider (sp). Event forward captures that at time t the service provider
forwards the data of type θ and value v from or to the third parties specified in the set towhom.
Definition 2 (Trace). A trace τ is a sequence of abstract events.
Traces capture the current operation of a system, which can be either compliant or non-
compliant with the data protection requirements. In order to define the notion of compliant
traces, we need to introduce first the notion of abstract states for capturing the states of data.
Definition 3 (Abstract state). The abstract state of a system is a function∑
: (User × User × Type) → (Time × Value × Places × Policy × Has).
The abstract state associated with the data dt whose owner is ow, of type θ, and containning
information about the data subject ds (i.e., dt = (ow, ds, θ)), is composed of a timestamp, the
current value of the data, the places where the data is currently stored (Places), the current policy
attached to this data, and a set of users who have this data at this time. Specifically:
(ow, ds, θ) → (t, v, plc, piθ, Hhas),
where piθ is an instance of the corresponding default policy piθ. The notation
∑
[(ow, ds, θ) →
(t, v, plc, piθ, Hhas)] captures a state update of the data of (ow, ds, θ) to the state on the rightside,
and is used to denote a state
∑′ similar to ∑ except that its value is (t, v, plc, piθ, Hhas).
The semantics of an event at a given position j in a trace is specified by the function SA:
(Event × N) → AbstractState → AbstractState. Specifically, we have:
1. SA(own, t, or, θ), j)
∑
=
∑
[(ow, ds, θ) → (t, v, plc, piθ, Hhas ∪ {or})]
2. SA((register, t, or, pservices, typeserv), j)
∑
=
∑
3. SA((store, t, dt, places, v), j)
∑
=
∑
[(ow, ds, θ) → (t, v, plc ∪ places, piθ, Hhas ∪ {sp})]
if piθ.pistr.ho = (nohidden, decl) ∧ piθ.pistr.wh = (sploc, places, decl)
=
∑
[(ow, ds, θ) → (t, v, plc ∪ places, piθ, Hhas)]
if piθ.pistr.ho = (hidden, decl) ∧ piθ.pistr.wh = (-, places, decl)
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=
∑
, else.
4. SA((storerev, t, dt, v, places), j)
∑
=
∑
.
5.SA((collect, t, sp, or, dt, v, purposes), j)
∑
=
∑
[(ow, ds, θ) → (t, v, plc, piθ, Hhas ∪ {sp})].
6. SA((cconsent, t, sp, tar, θ, v, purposes, piθ), j)
∑
=
∑
.
7. SA((uconsent, t, sp, tar, θ, v, purposes, piθ), j)
∑
=
∑
.
8. SA((fwconsent, t, sp, tar, θ, v, purposes, piθ), j)
∑
=
∑
.
9. SA((declare, t, sp, tar, v, params, piθ), j)
∑
=
∑
.
10. SA((use, t, or, dt, v, purposes, bywhom, j)
∑
=
∑
.
11. SA((deletereq, t, or, dt, v, piθ), j)
∑
=
∑
, if piθ.pidel.how.p1 = man, and
piθ.pistr.wh = (sploc, places, decl).
12. SA((mandelete, t, or, dt, v, places, piθ) , j)
∑
=
∑
[(ow, ds, θ) → ⊥], if piθ.pidel.how.p2 = full.
13. SA((autdelete, t, sp, dt, v, places, piθ) , j)
∑
=
∑
[(ow, ds, θ) → ⊥], if piθ.pidel.how.p2 = full.
14. SA((mandelete, t, or, dt, v, places, piθ) , j)
∑
=
∑
[(ow, ds, θ) → (t, v, plc \ places, piθ, Owner(plc \ places))],
if piθ.pidel.how.p2 = partly and or = sp.
15. SA((autdelete, t, sp, dt, v, places, piθ) , j)
∑
=
∑
[(ow, ds, θ) → (t, v, plc \ places, piθ, Owner(plc \ places))],
if piθ.pidel.how.p2 = partly.
16. SA((forward, t, sp, or, dt, v, purposes, towhom, piθ), j)
∑
=
∑
[(ow, ds, θ) → (t, v, plc, piθ, Hhas ∪ towhom)].
17. SA((unregister, t, or, pservices, typeserv), j)
∑
=
∑
.
The events storerev, cconsent, uconsent, declare and use do not change the current state of a
data. As a result of the event own the owner of the data dt is added to the set Hhas. The event
collect just adds the service provider sp to Hhas. The event store adds the service provider sp to
Hhas and also adds the set of storing places, places, to plc, either in case dt is stored unhidden
from the service provider (e.g., as plaintext at the service provider location or encrypted with the
service provider’s key). Otherwise, if the data is stored hidden, then the service provider does not
have it. Otherwise, the state is unchanged. Event deletereq does not change the current state,
however, it only takes place when the deletion policy allows manual deletion initiated by users.
Events mandelete and autdelete capture the deletion event itself in case the deletion has been
manually triggered by users (as a result of deletereq) and automatically set by the service provider
(without deletereq), respectively. For mandelete and autdelete, we further distinguish the case of
full and partly deletion modes (defined by piθ.pidel.how.p2). In the first case, the current state of dt
is replaced with the undefined state ⊥, representing full deletion from the system. Note that here,
we abstract away from some activities such as (1) the deletion request sent by the service provider
to the third party (in case they have the data), and (2) fully deletion of the data from the third
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party servers. In case of partly deletion, the new state of the dt will be the state in which places
is removed from the places in which dt is currently stored. These places can be e.g., main servers,
backup servers of the service provider. As a result of the deletion partly event (either autdelete or
mandelete), only the entities who own the places plc \ places, Owner(plc \ places), will have the
data.
5.3 Trace Compliance
Compliance for traces of events is defined to capture the system operation that respects data
control and accountability requirements. We define the most relevant trace compliance rules C1 -
C10, which are related directly to the data protection properties. The high-level interpretation of
each rule is as follows:
• C1: A perioric review on data storage (event storerev) can only take place in the specified
time interval according to the policy piθ.pistr.revdate.
• C2: For a dt = (ow, ds, θ), if piθ.pi∗.param.decl = Y (where pi∗ can be any from the five
sub-policies), then the corresponding value declval must be declared before the collection of
dt. For example, in the collection policy, picol.cpurp = (purpsetc, decl) defined above, if decl
= Y, then the corresponding purpsetc should be declared.
• C3: For a dt, if cons = Y in piθ.picol, then consent must be collected before the collection of
dt itself.
• C4: For a dt, if cons = Y in piθ.piuse, then the consent must be collected before the usage of
dt, for the specified purposes.
• C5: A data dt = (ow, ds, θ) is only used for purposes defined in the corresponding policy.
• C6: The manual deletion of a data dt = (ow, ds, θ) must happen within the specified deletion
delay, dd, and places places, after the deletion request (event deletereq) has been initiated.
• C7: The automated deletion of a data dt = (ow, ds, θ) must happen within the time interval
specified by the global deletion policy since data collection.
• C8: Whenever the data dt is forwarded by the service provider to a set of third parties, the
forwarding purposes and the addressee should conform with the defined policy of dt.
• C9: Whenever the data dt is forwarded by the service provider to a set of third parties,
appropriate consent should be collected before.
• C10: Whenever the data dt is collected, the set of collection purposes is a subset of the user
chosen services, and the type of the collected data (i.e., θ in dt) is an element of the set of
data types needed for the user chosen services.
Following [35], the current state after the execution of a trace τ = [ev1,. . . , evn] is defined as
FA(τ , 1)
∑
0 with ∀ (ow, ds θ):
∑
0(ow, ds θ) = ⊥, and
• FA([ ], n)
∑
=
∑
.
• FA([ev1, . . . , evm], n)
∑
= FA([ev2, . . . , evm], n+ 1)(SA(ev1, n)
∑
)
where, StateA(τ , i) = FA(τ|i, 1)
∑
0 with τ|i = τ1 . . . τi representing the prefix of length i of τ .
In Fig. 2, the rule C1 says that if at τi, the i-th step of the trace (i.e., the system operation
at time t′), there is an event storerev, then t′ should be in the predefined revision time. The rules
C2 and C3 say that if at the i-th step of the trace there is a collection event, then sometimes
before that there should be a corresponding declaration and consent collection, respectively, and
the entity from whom the consent has been collected (tar) should be the same as the entity from
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• C1 : τi = (storerev, t′, dt, v, places) ∧ StateA(τ, i − 1)(ow, ds, θ) =
(t, v, plc, piθ,Hhas) =⇒ t′ ∈ piθ.pistr.revdate
• C2 : τi = (collect, t′, sp, or, dt, v, purposes) ∧ StateA(τ, i− 1)(ow, ds, θ) =
(t, v, plc, piθ,Hhas) ∧ (piθ.pi∗.param.decl = Y) =⇒ ∃ k | ∃ t′′ | τk =
(declare, t′′, sp, tar, dt, v, piθ.pi∗.param.declval, piθ) ∧ (t′′ < t′) ∧ (tar =
or), where pi∗ ∈ {picol, piuse, pistr, pidel, pifw}
• C3 : τi = (collect, t′, sp, or, dt, v, purposes) ∧ StateA(τ, i− 1)(ow, ds, θ) =
(t, v, plc, piθ,Hhas) ∧ (piθ.picol.cons = Y) =⇒ ∃ k | ∃ t′′ | τk =
(cconsent, t′′, sp, tar, dt, v, purposes, piθ) ∧ (t′′ < t′) ∧ (tar = or) ∧
(purposes ⊆ piθ.picol.cpurp.purpsetc)
• C4 : τi = (use, t′, or, dt, v, purposes, bywhom) ∧ StateA(τ, i −
1)(ow, ds, θ) = (t, v, plc, piθ,Hhas) ∧ (piθ.piuse.cons = Y) =⇒
∃ k | ∃ t′′ | τk = (uconsent, t′′, sp, tar, dt, v, purposes, piθ) ∧ (t′′ < t′) ∧
(tar = or) ∧ (purposes ⊆ piθ.piuse.upurp.purpsetu)
• C5 : τi = (use, t′, or, dt, v, purposes, bywhom) ∧ StateA(τ, i −
1)(ow, ds, θ) = (t, v, plc, piθ,Hhas) =⇒ purposes ⊆
piθ.piuse.upurp.purpsetu ∧ bywhom ⊆ piθ.piuse.whouse.who ∧ by-
whom ⊆ Hhas
• C6 : τi = (deletereq, t′, or, dt, v, piθ) ∧ StateA(τ, i − 1)
(ow, ds, θ) = (t, v, plc, piθ,Hhas) =⇒ ∃ k | ∃ t′′ | τk =
(mandelete, t′′, or, dt, v, places, piθ) ∧ (t′ < t′′ ≤ t′ + piθ.pidel.deld.dd)
• C7 : τi = (unregister, t′, or, , pservices, typeserv) ∧ StateA(τ, i − 1)
(ow, ds, θ) = (t, v, plc, piθ,Hhas) =⇒ ∃ k | ∃ t′′ | τk =
(autdelete, t′′, or, dt, v, places, piθ) ∧ (t′ < t′′ ≤ t′ + piθ.pidel.gdeld.dcond).
• C8 : τi = (forward, t′, sp, or, dt, v, purposes, towhom, piθ) ∧ StateA(τ, i −
1)(ow, ds, θ) = (t, v, plc, piθ,Hhas) =⇒ purposes ⊆ piθ.pifw.fwpurp ∧
towhom ⊆ piθ.pifw.3rdparty
• C9 : τi = (forward, t′, sp, or, dt, v, purposes, towhom, piθ)
∧ StateA(τ, i − 1)(ow, ds, θ) = (t, v, plc, piθ,Hhas) ∧ (piθ.pifw.cons =
Y)) =⇒ ∃ k | ∃ t | τk = (fwconsent, t, {tari}, dt, v, purposes, piθ) ∧
(t < t′) ∧ ({tar i} ⊆ or ∪ {orj}) ∧ (purposes ⊆ piθ.pifw.fwpurp)
• C10 : τi = (collect, t′, sp, or, dt, v, purposes) ∧ StateA(τ, i−1)(ow, ds, θ) =
(t, v, plc, piθ,Hhas) =⇒ ∃ k | ∃ t | τk = (register, t, or, pservices, typeserv)
∧ (t < t′) ∧ (purposes ⊆ pservices) ∧ (θ ∈ typeserv)
Figure 2: Trace compliance rules for a policy.
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whom the data has been collected (or). C4 is similar to the previous two rules but related to the
data usage. C5 says that if the data dt is used by the service provider sp for some purposes at the
i-th event in a trace, and the policy at the (i− 1)th state is piθ, then purposes must be the subset
of piθ.piuse.upurp.purpsetu and the entities in the set towhom must have dt. The rule C6 says that
whenever there is a deletion request for dt this must be done within the specified deletion delay.
The rule C7 states that whenever an user unregisters from the service, the wors-case deletion must
be done within the specified deletion delay. The rules C8 and C9 define policy compliance for data
forwarding. C8 says that the forwarding purposes and the addressee in the event must be subsets
of the specified purposes and addressee in the policy. C9 says that if the consent option cons is set
to cons = Y in the policy, then a corresponding consent must be collected before dt is forwarded.
Finally, C10 captures a strict aspect of the data minimisation requirement.
The formalization of these compliance rules can be found in Fig. 2. Trace compliance is defined
with respect to the rules above. In the following definition and properties, let dt|θ represents any
data of type θ and dt refers to any tuple of given values of ow, ds and θ.
Definition 4 (Low-level system implementation) Let SysImp be a system implementation,
which is a composition of specific protocols and procedures. Further, let SysImpOp(θ) be the system
operation with a data dt of type θ, and a set of low-level actions ACsysimp(θ) = {αsys1 ,. . . , αsysm }
for some finite m that can happen during any possible system operation sequences.
SysImpOp(θ) is a set of all possible sequences of low-level actions, namely, we have SysImpOp(θ)
= {SeqACsysimp(θ)}. Each operation sequence is a trace of subsequent low-level actions performed at
a given time value:
SeqACsysimp = statei
αsys
i
,ti−→ statei+1
αsys
i+1,ti+1−→ . . .α
sys
i+n−1,ti+n−1−→ statei+n.
Low-level actions can be, for example, sending or receiving some message, computing some
function or a verification of the received message, etc. For illustration purposes, let us consider
the action trace SeqACsysimp(θ) above, and as an example, let α
sys
i = send(or, tar, V :θ, purposes)
captures that an entity or sends a message of value V and type θ to another entity tar, while
αsysi+n−1 = recv(tar, or, V :θ, purposes) captures the reception of that message by tar. Hence, if (θ
= useconsent) and (or = cust), (tar = sp), then state statei+n captures that the usage consent of
data V has been collected by the service provider at time ti+n−1.
We let SysImpOp be the system operation for all the supported types, namely, SysImpOp =⋃
∀θ∈TypeSys{SeqACsysimp(θ)}.
In the following definitions, we let
C = {C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C7, C8, C9, C10}
Trace rule-compliance relation: Let us denote by seqθ ≺rulepol Ci the fact that a given operation
trace seqθ∈ SysImpOp(θ) of a system implementation SysImp, on a data of type θ, is in compliance
with a rule Ci ∈ C.
Definition 5 (trace piθ-compliance, seqθ ≺pol C)
An operation trace seqθ∈ SysImpOp(θ) of a system implementation SysImp, on a data of type θ, is
in compliance with a DPR sub-policy piθ if it satisfies all the properties in C, ∀Ci ∈ C: seqθ ≺rulepol
Ci. This is denoted by (seqθ ≺pol C).
The DPR trace compliancy is relevant for verifying if a specific system implementation (e.g.,
protocol, system log procedure) complies with a given policy.
Definition 6 (system piθ-compliance, SysImp ≺syspol C)
A system implementation SysImp is compliant with a DPR sub-policy piθ if ∀seqθ ∈ SysImpOp(θ):
seqθ ≺pol C. We denote this by (SysImp ≺syspol C).
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Definition 7 (system PL-compliance, SysImp |=pol PL)
A system implementation SysImp is compliant with a policy PL if ∀seqθ ∈ SysImpOp(θ) and ∀piθ
∈ PL: seqθ ≺pol C. This is denoted by SysImp |=pol PL.
Property 1 (Has dt|θ up to piθ)
An entity e, e ∈ EntityPL, has a data of type up to the policy piθ iff
∃ τ , i, ow, ds: StateA(τ, i)(ow, ds, θ) = (t, v, plc, piθ,Hhas) ∧ (e ∈ Hhas). We denote this by [e
has dt|θ]piθ .
If this does not satisfy/hold, then we denote it by [e ¬has dt|θ]piθ .
Property 2 (Has dt up to piθ)
An entity e, e ∈ EntityPL, has the data dt = (ow, ds, θ) for given ow and ds, up to the policy
piθ iff
∃ τ , i: StateA(τ, i)(ow, ds, θ) = (t, v, plc, piθ,Hhas) ∧ (e ∈ Hhas). We denote this by [e has
dt]piθ .
Property 3 (Has dt|θ up to PL) If ∃e, dt|θ: e ∈ EntityPL and dt|θ ∈ DataPL and [e has
dt|θ]piθ , then we have [e has dt|θ]PL.
If this does not satisfy/hold, then we denote it by [e ¬has dt|θ]PL.
Property 4 (Has dt up to PL) If ∃e, dt = (ow, ds, θ): e ∈ EntityPL and dt ∈ DataPL and [e
has dt]piθ , then we have [e has dt]PL.
An entity in the system is allowed to have the data dt if and only if this is explicitly specified
in the policy piθ. Therefore, in case a system allows unathorised access to a data dt, it violates the
policy piθ. The main difference between the Property 1 and 2 as well as between Property 3 and
4 is that in the first cases the property is defined on any data of type θ, regardless of the value of
ow and ds, while the latter cases are defined on the data with given ow, ds and θ.
6 The Corresponding Architecture Level
To check the conformance of a system architecture with a given data protection (DPR) policy,
we propose an architecture language, called ADC . ADC follows a similar concept of the language
outlined in [34], however, it has been modified accordingly for our purposes. Unlike the architecture
language outlined in [6,34], which mainly focuses on data computation and verification of the data
integrity and trust relation, our ADC primary captures the personal data protection properties on
the end-to-end data life-cycle to fit with the policy language. Hence, ADC defines different syntax
and semantics elements compared to [6, 34].
6.1 Architectures Syntax
We assume that an architecture for a service provider SP is composed of a finite set of entities,
EntitySPPA = {Ei1 , . . . , Eim}. Also let TYPESPPA be the set of all the supported types in the
architecture.
We assume a finite set of data subjects (ds ∈ EntitySPPA), and data owners ow ∈ EntitySPPA),
as well as a finite set of types (θ ∈ TYPESPPA). We also assume a finite set of variables Var, X˜ ∈
Var, and values Val, D ∈ Val.
PartOf : PartOf is a function that expects an entity as input and returns a set of other entities
in the same architecture (which are parts of the input entity). For example, if Em and Ep represent
a smart meter, and a digital panel (tablet), respectively, and we want to specify that they are parts
of the service provider, Esp, then, we let PartOf (Esp) = {Em, Ep}. This function is important
for conformance check as several entities may be parts of a same entity, hence, for example, if the
smart meter or the panel has the customer data, then it also means that the service provider has
this data.
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PatOf :
PartOf : Ee ∈ EntitySPPA → {Ee ∈ EntitySPPA}
Terms:
T ::= BT | D | Decl | Cp(X˜)
id ::= xk | c, where k and c can be any constant.
BT ::= X˜ | F (BT1, . . . , BTn) | D
X˜ ::= Xxdsow,θ | X|θ
D ::= V dsow,θ
C ::= Vpurpj | ddj | TTj
Destructors:
G(X˜1, . . . , X˜n) → X˜
Type:
TYPE(T ) ::= θ, where θ ∈ TYPESPPA
Owner :
OWNER(X˜) = Eow, where Eow ∈ EntitySPPA.
Figure 3: Terms, Destructors and Types.
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Terms: Terms model any data defined in the architecture. Term T is defined as in the Fig. 3.
A term can be a variable (Xxdsow,θ, X|θ) that represents some data, a term can also be a data
constant (V dsow,θ) and other constant (D) that represent the value of a data, as well as a copy of
any data X˜ (denoted by Cp(X˜). Finally, id can be an index variable xk or an index constant
c. During the system operations, variables will be bounded to values, and index constant will be
bounded to index variables.
For each entity E we define a finite set of variables (i.e., data) Var = {X˜ | TYPE(X˜) = θ,
θ ∈ TYPESPPA} of type θ that it owns and inputs it into the system. A variable Xxdsow,θ ∈ Var
represents any kind of data supported by a service provider, such as the users’ basic information,
photos, videos, posts, energy consumption data, etc. We distinguish Xxdsow,θ and X|θ, where in
the second case only the type of the data is given. For example, X|θSkey and X|θCkey represent a
service provider’s crypto key and the customer’s key, respectively. xds is an index variable that
captures the data subject included in a given data. Index constants ow and θ denotes the owner
and the type of a given data, respectively. For instance, Xxdscustomer1,θphoto represents a photo of
the customer1 about a data subject xds. During the system operation, specific values will be
given to the index variable xds and the variable X itself (as we may have different photos during
different system runs). Similarly, data type can be anything, such as basic personal information,
energy consumption data, etc. F is a function that can be, for instance, encryption (symmetric,
asymmetric, homomorphic), hash, digital signature. Function Cp(X˜) returns a copy of X˜.
A variable Xxdsow,θ is given specific data value V dsow,θ during a system run, such that ow and θ in
X are the same to those in V , while the index variable xds will be bounded to a constant ds. In
V dsow,θ, the index constant ow denotes the owner of the data, ds denotes the data subject included
in the data, and id is a unique ID of the data in the system. Note that ds and ow can be the same,
e.g., when ow owns an energy consumption data about itself. Note that the type of V dsow,θ should
be the same as the type of the variable to which it is bound. We also define other constants such
as a purpose (Vpurpj), a deletion delay (ddj), or a time value (TT j).
Destructors: A destructor represents an evaluation of a function. For instance, if the function
F is an encryption or a digital signature, then the corresponding destructor G is the decryption
or signature verification procedure. More precisely, if X˜1 = Enc(X˜, X|θSkey ) that represents the
encryption of data X˜ with the server key X|θSkey , and X˜2 = X|θSkey , then G(X˜1, X˜2) → X˜ is
Dec(Enc(X˜, X|θSkey ), X|θSkey )→ X˜. Note that not all functions have a corresponding destructor,
e.g., in case X˜1 is a one-way cryptographic hash function, X˜1 = Hash(X˜), then due to the one-way
property there is no destructor (reverse procedure) that returns X˜ from the hash X˜1.
Architecture: An architecture PA is defined by a set of activities of users or service providers
(denoted by {F}). The formal definition of privacy architectures is given as follows:
Activity Owne(X˜) captures that Ee owns the data variable X˜. If we write Owne(X|θ), then
we can also indicate the type of the data owned by Ee. Registere1,e2(pservices, typeserv) captures
that Ee1 registers with Ee2 for the services pservices that requires the set of data types typeserv.
Computee(X˜ = BT ) captures that an entity Ee can compute the variable X˜ based on the equation
X˜ = BT . Receivee1,e2(X˜) specifies that Ee1 received X˜ from Ee2, Storee(X˜, Places) says that
Ee stores X˜ in the set of places Places, where Places is a set of entities E ∈ {EMaine , EBckUpe}.
EMaine represents the Storereve(X˜, Places, TT ) captures that Ee reviews the need of storing X˜
further in the place Places at a predefined time TT.
Collecte1,e2(X˜, Purposes) captures that Ee1 collects the data X˜ with the purposes Purposes
from an entity Ee2. Purposes contains the constant purpose values (Vpurp) of the data collection.
Usebywhom(X˜, Purposes) captures the usage of X˜ by entities in bywhom for the purposes Purposes.
Forwarde,towhom(X˜, Purposes) captures that Ee forwards X˜ with purposes Purposes and to the
entities in the set towhom. The activities CConsente1,e2(X˜, Purposes), UConsente1,e2(X˜, Pur-
poses) and FwConsente1,e2(X˜, Purposes, ToWhom) captures the consent collection activities by
Ee1 from Ee2 for data collection, usage and data forwarding, respectively. Purposes and ToWhom
are the set of purposes and entities to whom data X˜ will be forwarded, these are showed/revealed
to the users when consents are collected from them.
The activity Declaree1,e2(X˜, DeclParams) captures the declaration of the parameters De-
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PA ::= {F}
F ::= Owne(X˜)
| Registere1,e2(pservices, typeserv)
| Computee(X˜ = BT )
| Receivee1,e2(X˜)
| Storee(X˜, Places)
| Storereve(X˜, Places, TT )
| Collecte1,e2(X˜, Purposes)
| Usebywhom(X˜, Purposes)
| Forwarde,towhom(X˜, Purposes)
| CConsente1,e2(X˜, Purposes)
| UConsente1,e2(X˜, Purposes, ByWhom)
| FwConsente1,e2(X˜, Purposes, ToWhom)
| Declaree1,e2(X˜, DeclParams)
| DeleteReqe1,e2(X˜)
| ManDeletee(X˜, Places, dd)
| AutDeletee(X˜, Places, dd)
| UnRegistere1,e2(pservices, typeserv).
Figure 4: The table shows the syntax of a system architecture consisting of activities between
entities. The indices e, e1, e2 refer to the entities Ee, Ee1, Ee2, respectively.
clParams by Ee1 to Ee2, which is a set of any parameters such as the elements from Purposes,
Places, dd, TT, ByWhom, ToWhom. The activities DeleteReqe1,e2(X˜, Places) and ManDeletee(X˜,
Places, dd) say that an entity Ee1 sends a deletion request to Ee2 for X˜ from the places Places.
ManDeletee(X˜, Places, dd) and AutDeletee(X˜, Places, dd), with a predefined deletion delay dd,
refer to a manual and automated deletion modes, which captures that the deletion must take place
within dd delay after Ee received a deletion request (in the first case), or within certain worst-case
deletion delay once a certain event happens (in the latter case). Finally, the function OWNER(X˜)
returns the owner of the data X˜, which is the entity that inputs this data into the system.
6.2 Architectures Semantics
The semantics of an architecture is based on its set of compatible traces. A trace Γ is a sequence
of high-level events Seq() occurring in the system as presented in the Table below.
Events: A trace is a operation sequence of a system, and is composed of high-level events.
Events can be seen as instantiated activities defined in the Fig. 4 happened at time t, with
the variables bounded to specific values (the notion instantiation here is similar to the term
instantiation used in object oriented programming languages). Events are given the same names
as the corresponding activities but in lowercase letters in order to avoid confusion. For example,
the events registere1,e2 and unregistere1,e2 are the instances of the activities Registere1,e2 and
Unregistere1,e2 with the same parameters at the time t. The event owne(X˜:D, t) captures that Ee
owns X˜ with a value D at the time t. X˜:D means that the variable X˜ is bounded to the value D.
The event storee(X˜:D, Places, t) saying that the service provider or an user/a client stores the data
represented by X˜ with value D in the places from the set Places at time t. receivee1,e2(X˜:D, t) says
that Ee1 received X˜ of a value D from Ee2 at the time t. storereve(X˜:D, Places, tt, t) is related to
the storage review by Ee. The events cconsente1,e2, uconsente1,e2 and fwconsente1,e2 capture the
events when the service provider collects the corresponding consents about data collection, usage
and forwarding, respectively. The events collect and use can be interpreted in a similar way as
the architecture, but with a certain value D and time value t. Finally, the event declaree1,e2 is an
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Γ ::= Seq()
 ::= owne(X˜:D, t)
| registere1,e2(pservices, typeserv, t)
| computee(X˜ = BT , t)
| storee(X˜:D, Places, t)
| receivee1,e2(X˜:D, t)
| storereve(X˜:D, Places, TT , t)
| collecte1,e2(X˜:D, Purposes, t)
| usebywhom(X˜:D, Purposes, t)
| forwarde,towhom(X˜:D, Purposes, t)
| cconsente1,e2(X˜:D, Purposes, t)
| uconsente1,e2(X˜:D, Purposes, ByWhom, t)
| fwconsente1,e2(X˜:D, Purposes, ToWhom, t)
| declaree1,e2(X˜:D, DeclParams, t)
| deletereqe1,e2(X˜:D, t)
| mandeletee(X˜:D, Places, dd, t)
| autdeletee(X˜:D, Places, dd, t)
| unregistere1,e2(pservices, typeserv, t).
Figure 5: Events and event sequence for architecture.
instance of the activity Declaree1,e2 during the low-level system run.
An architecture is said to be consistent if each variable can be initially owned (Owne) by only a
single entity Ee. In the rest of the paper, we only consider consistent architectures and consistent
traces.
States: The semantics of events is defined based on entity states and the global state. The state
of an entity Ee, denoted by σe, is the variable state that assigns a value (including the undefined
value ⊥) to each variable (StateV ). Note that during the system operation, the variable states
of different entities can change in a different way, depending on the status of the variable from
the entity’s perspective. For instance, let’s assume that the service provider Esp receives a gas
consumption reading Xxdscust,gas of a customer cust that has value V custcust,gas, then in σe , Xxdscust,gas
will be bound to V custcust,gas, while Xxdscust,gas still has the undefined value for an another Ei who did
not receive Xxdscust,gas.
σe: State of Entity Ee
StateV = (Var→ Val⊥).
Assume that there are m entities Ee1 , . . . , Eem defined in the architecture. The global state is
the composition of all the entity states is defined on StatemV × Time. StatemV is the composition
of m entity states. Global state is denoted by σ, where σ = (σe1 , . . . , σem , tt).
σ: Global State
State = (StatemV × Time).
The initial (global) state for an architecture PA is denoted by σinit, and is the composition
of the initial states of each defined entities. In the initial state of each entity, UnDef denotes the
undefined variable state (∀X˜ ∈ Var,UnDef(X˜) = ⊥). This means that initially the values of all
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the variables defined in the architecture are undefined. Values will be assigned to variables at
certain time during the system operation, which is captured by events. In addition, it contains
the four initial permission groups defined by the architecture. Finally, the initial time value is also
undefined.
σinit: Initial Global State
σinit = (σinite1 , . . . , σ
init
em , tt
init) with
∀i ∈ [1,m], σinitei = UnDef
ttinit = ⊥.
In the following, we refer to each element of σ by σ.σe1 , . . . , σ.σem , and σ.tt.
The semantics function ST is defined in the Fig 6, which specifies the impact of a trace on the
state of each entity Ee in the architecture. It is defined as an iteration through the trace with
function SE defining the impact of each type of event on the states of the users.
Trace and state updates: The notation .Γ is used to denote a trace whose first element is
 and the rest of the trace is Γ. Each event modifies can either modify the global state (and entity
state) or leave it unchanged. To capture the modification made by an event at time t on (only) the
variable state of an entity Ee we write σ[σe/σe[X˜/D], tt/t] (or σ[σe/σe[X˜/⊥], tt/t] in the case of
the undefined value, e.g., when a variable has been deleted). Intuitively, this denotation captures
that the old state σe is replaced with the new state σe[X˜/D], in which the variable X˜ has been
given the value D (or undefined value ⊥) as a result of the event, the time tt variable is given the
value t. Finally, σ[tt/t] captures only a time change.
Definition 8 (Semantics of architectures) The semantics of an architecture PA is defined
as: S(PA) = {σ ∈ State | ∃ Γ ∈ T (PA), ST (Γ, σinit) = σ}.
Semantics of the architecture events: In the Figure 6, ST is the semantic function of
event traces which takes the current trace and global state as inputs and returns an updated
global state. SE is the semantic function for events, defining how each event makes changes on
the global state. For the empty trace ST leaves the global state unchanged. For a non empty state
with event  as prefix, ST proceeds with the tail θ and the state after  took effect. As a result of
the event own, the state of Ee is updated by binding value D to the variable X˜, and the variable
tt is bounded to t, while the permission state stays unchanged. The event register only changes
the time value in the global state, it has been introduced to reason about compliant traces later.
The event compute binds the value eval(BT , σe) to X˜ at time t, where eval(BT ,σe) represents
the evaluation of the value of BT in the current variable state of Ee. The event receivee1,e2(X˜:D,
t) updates the state of Ee1 by given X˜ a value D.
For the event store we distinguish two cases, in the first case, the data is stored only in the
main storage places (We let the entity EMaine represent a (group of) main storage place(s) of Ee).
As a result of the store event, in the state of Ee the value of X˜ is bounded to D. In the second
case, a copy of X˜ (Cp(X˜)) is stored at the backup place(s) of Ee (denoted by EBckUpe). This
time, in the state of Ee, Cp(X˜) gets the same value D as X˜. The event collecte1,e2 binds the value
of X˜ to D in the variable state of Ee1, σe1. The event usebywhom binds the variable in σe to D for
every Ee ∈ bywhom. The events storerev, cconsent, uconsent, fwconsent do not affect the global
state of the architecture, except for the time.
The event deletereqe1,e2 does not affect the current state, while mandeletee and autdeletee
change the value of X˜ to the undefined value, ⊥, as the following: In case the deletion only takes
place in the main storage place (EMaine), the value of X˜ is bounded to ⊥ in the state of every
entity. In case the deletion is carried out from both EMaine and EBckUpe , beside X˜, its copy Cp(X˜)
is also bounded to ⊥ in the state of every entity.
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ST : Trace × State → State SE : Event × State → State
ST (〈〉, σ) = σ ST (.θ, σ) = ST (θ, SE(, σ))
SE(owne
(
X˜ : D, t
)
, σ) = σ[σe/σe[X˜/D], tt/t]
SE(registere1,e2(pservices, typeserv, t), σ) = σ[tt/t]
SE(computee(X˜ = BT , t), σ) = σ [σe/σe[X˜/eval(BT ,σe)], tt/t]
SE(receivee1,e2(X˜ : D, t), σ) = σ[σe1/σe1[X˜/D], tt/t]
SE(storee(X˜ : D, {EMaine}, t), σ) = σ[σe/σe[X˜/D], tt/t]
SE(storereve(X˜ : D, {EMaine}, TT , t), σ) = σ[tt/t]
SE(storee(X˜ : D, {EMaine , EBckUpe}, t), σ) = σ [σe/σe[X˜/D, Cp(X˜)/D], tt/t]
SE(storereve(X˜ : D, {EMaine , EBckUpe}, TT , t), σ) = σ[tt/t]
SE(collecte1,e2(X˜ : D, Purposes, t), σ) = σ [σe1/σe1[X˜/D], tt/t]
SE(usebywhom(X˜ : D, Purposes, t), σ) = σ [σe/(σe[X˜/D], tt/t | ∀ Ee ∈ bywhom]
SE(forwarde1,towhom(X˜ : D, Purposes, t), σ) = σ [σe/σe[X˜/D], tt/t | ∀ Ee ∈ towhom]
SE(uconsente1,e2(X˜ : D, Purposes, ByWhom, t), σ) = σ[tt/t]
SE(fwconsente1,e2(X˜ : D, Purposes, ToWhom, t), σ) = σ[tt/t]
SE(declaree1,e2(X˜ : D, DeclParam, t), σ) = σ[tt/t]
SE(deletereqe1,e2(X˜ : D, t), σ) = σ[tt/t]
SE(mandeletee(X˜ : D, {EMaine , EBckUpe}, dd, t), σ)
= σ [σe/σe[X˜/⊥, Cp(X˜)/⊥], tt/t) | ∀ Ee ∈ Entity].
SE(autdeletee(X˜ : D, {EMaine , EBckUpe}, dd, t), σ)
= σ [σe / (σve [{X˜/⊥, Cp(X˜)/⊥}], tt/t | ∀ Ee ∈ Entity].
SE(mandeletee(X˜ : D, {Maine}, dd, t), σ) = σ [σe/(σe[X˜/⊥], tt/t | ∀ Ee ∈ Entity].
SE(autdeletee(X˜ : D, {Mainsp}, dd, t), σ) = σ [σe/σe[X˜/⊥], tt/t | ∀ Ee ∈ Entity]
SE(unregistere1,e2(pservices, typeserv, t), σ) = σ[tt/t].
Figure 6: Semantics of architectural events.
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Definition 9 (Compatibility) A trace θ of length θ is compatible with an architecture PA if
and only if:
∀k ∈ [1, θ], ifθk 6= computee(X˜ = BT, t) then ∃pa ∈ PA : C(θk, pa)
where C(, pa) holds if and only if  can be obtained from pa by giving specific values for variables
and instantiating (binding) index variables to index constants. θk represents the k-th event in the
trace θ.
We can now define the semantics of an architecture PA as the set of the possible states produced
by consistent traces.
6.3 Deduction rules for verifying privacy properties
In this section, we outline our improved version of a privacy logic (compared to [34]) to reason
about the privacy requirements of architectures (i.e., who can have or obtain a given data based
in the architecture).
φ ::= HASe(X˜, t) | HASnote (X˜, t) | HASnevere (X˜) | φ1 ∧ φ2
Definition 10 provides the semantics of a property φ.
Definition 10 The semantics S(φ) of a property φ is defined in Table 1 as the set of architectures
satisfying φ.
PA ∈ S(HASe
(
X˜, t
)
) ⇔ ∃ σ ∈ S(PA): σ.σe(X˜) 6= ⊥ ∧ σ.tt = t and if completely defined (i.e.,
X˜ does not contain any ⊥)
PA ∈ S(HASnote
(
X˜, t
)
) ⇔ ∃ σ ∈ S(PA): σ.σe(X˜) = ⊥ ∧ σ.tt = t
PA ∈ S(HASnevere
(
X˜
)
) ⇔ ∀ σ ∈ S(PA) : σ.σe(X˜) = ⊥
PA ∈ S(φ1 ∧ φ2) ⇔ PA ∈ S(φ1) ∧ PA ∈ S(φ2)
Table 1: Semantics of the HAS properties.
The Table 1 says that an architecture satisfies the HASe(X˜, t) property if and only if an entity
Ee can obtain the value of X˜ in at least one compatible execution trace θ (in the global state σ
and local state σe of Ee), whereas HASnevere (X˜) holds if and only if there is no execution trace
θ that can lead to a state in which Ee obtains a value of X˜. Finally, HASnote (X˜, t) specifies the
time t, after which Ee will not be able to get a value of X˜. Finally, statisfying φ1 ∧ φ2 means
satistying both the properties φ1 and φ2 at the same time.
In order to reason about the privacy property of architectures, a set of deduction rules (axioms)
is provided in Table 7. The fact that an architecture PA satisfies a property φ is denoted by PA `
φ. Deduction rules (H1-H15) are defined in the Table 7 to capture privacy related requirements,
namely, investigate whether an entity can have a given data.
In Fig 7, rulesH1,H2,H3 andH4 say that if the architecture containsOwne(X˜), Computee(X˜ =
BT ), Receivee1,e2(X˜) or Storee(X˜,Places), respectively, then entity Ee (Ee1) has X˜ at some time
t during the system run. H5 is related to the data collection by Ee1 from Ee2 and says that if
there is a collection activity defined in the architecture then Ee1 has the data X˜ at some time.
H6 says that if there is a forward activity in the architecture PA, then and the service provider
has X˜ at time t, then the addressee Ei will have X˜ at some time t′. H7 and H8 capture the
background deduction and computation ability of an entity Ee. Specifically, H7 says that if there
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H1 :
Owne
(
X˜
)∈PA
PA `∃t HASe
(
X˜, t
)
H2 :
Computee
(
X˜ = BT
)∈PA
PA `∃t HASe
(
X˜, t
)
H3 :
Receivee1,e2
(
X˜
)∈PA
PA `∃t HASe1
(
X˜, t
)
H4 :
Storee
(
X˜, P laces
)∈PA
PA `∃t HASe
(
X˜, t
)
H5 :
Collecte1,e2
(
X˜,Purposes
)∈PA
PA `∃t HASe1
(
X˜, t
)
H6 :
Forwarde1,towhom
(
X˜,Purposes
)∈PA ∧ Ee2 ∈ towhom ∧ PA `∃t HASe1 (X˜, t)
PA `∃t′ HASe2
(
X˜, t′
)
H7 :
∃ G : BackgroundDeductione(G(X˜1, . . . , X˜n)→ X˜) ∧
PA `∃t HASe
(
X˜1, t
) ∧ . . . ∧ HASe (X˜n, t)
PA `∃t HASe
(
X˜, t
)
H8 :
∃ F : BackgroundCompe(X˜ = F (X˜1, . . . , X˜n)) ∧
PA `∃t HASe
(
X˜1, t
) ∧ . . . ∧ HASe (X˜n, t)
PA `∃t HASe
(
X˜, t
)
Figure 7: HAS deduction rules for architectures (part 1).
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is a destructor G(X˜1, . . . , X˜n) → X˜, and Ee is capable to perform this operation, then when Ee
has the value of X˜1, . . . , X˜n then it will be able to derive the value of X˜. H8 says that if Ee has
the value of each X˜1, . . . , X˜n, then if it is capable to compute the function F , then it will have
the value of X˜.
H9 :
Usebywhom
(
X˜,Purposes
)∈PA ∧ Ee ∈ bywhom
PA `∃t HASe
(
X˜, t
)
H10 :
None of the pre-conditions of H1-H9 holds for X˜and Ee
PA ` HASnevere
(
X˜
)
H11 :
{ManDeletee(X˜, {EMaine}, dd),Storee(X˜, {EMaine , EBckUpe})} ⊆PA
PA `∃t,∀Ee1∈EntitySPPA\{Ee} HAS
not
e1
(
X˜, t
)
H12 :
ManDeletee(X˜, {EMaine , EBckUpe}, dd) ∈PA
PA `∃t,∀Ee1∈EntitySPPA HAS
not
e1
(
X˜, t
)
H13 :
{ManDeletee(X˜, {EMaine}, dd),Storee(X˜, {EMaine , EBckUpe})} ⊆PA
PA `∃t,∀Ei∈EntitySPPA\{Ee} HAS
not
e1
(
X˜, t
)
H14 :
AutDeletee(X˜, {EMaine , EBckUpe}, dd) ∈PA
PA `∃t,∀Ee1∈EntitySPPA HAS
not
e1
(
X˜, t
)
H15 :
PA `∃t,∀Ee1,Ee2∈EntitySPPA,Ee1∈PartOf(Ee2) HASe1
(
X˜, t
)
PA `∃t HASe2
(
X˜, t
)
Figure 8: HAS deduction rules for architectures (part 2).
In Fig 8, H9 is related to the Usebywhom activity, saying that if an entity Ee will use X˜ then it
will have the value of X˜ at some time t. H9 captures that in case none of the H1-H9 takes place
from Ee’s perspevtive during the system run, then Ee will never have the value of X˜.
RulesH11-H14 are related to the deletion activities. H11 says that ifManDeletee(X˜, {EMaine}, dd)
is part of the architecture, namely, Ee has the ability to delete X˜ from its main storage server then
all entities in the system except for Ee will not have X˜ from that point (captured by some time
t). Ee will still have X˜ in its backup server. On the other hand, in H12 if the data is deleted from
both the main and the backup servers, then no entity in the system will have the value of data
X˜. H13 and H14 are interpreted in the similar way as H11−H12, but related to the automated
deletion mode.
Finally, rule H15 is about the PartOf function, saying that for every Ee1 adn Ee2 from the set
of all the defined entities, if Ee1 ∈ PartOf (Ee2), then whenever Ee1 has X˜, Ee2 also has X˜.
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6.4 DPR trace compliance in architectures
Similarly to the case of policies we define compliance rules for traces of events in architectures to
capture a system operation that respects the data protection regulation requirements. Below, we
assume that X˜ is a personal data.
• A1: This rule basically says that any data collection made by Ee1 should be preceded by
a corresponding consent collection from the owner of the data. We recall that the owner
of the data is the entity who inputs the data into the system. The rational behind the
option Ee3 6= Ee1 is that the service provider can consist of several smaller components, and
the component that collects the data can be different from the component that collects the
consent. The case is similar for Ee2 and Ee4, as the data can be collected either from the
owner or from some component of the owner.
• A2: This rule says that when a data of value D is used by the entities in bywhom, the
corresponding usage consent should have been collected from the owner of the data such
that bywhom is the subset of the set defined in the given consent.
• A3: This rule is similar to A2 but related to data forwarding.
• A4: This rule says that whenever there is a deletion request from an entity Ee2 to Ee1, then
this should be fulfilled within the pre-specified delay dd. DEL is a set of deletereq events
in the trace Γ. An architecture can contain several DeleteReq activities, and the deletion
request can be forwarded by several entities until it reaches Ee1. Hence, deletereqe2,e1(X˜ : D,
t′) ∈ DEL means that Ee1 receives the request directly from Ee2, but Ee2 can also receive
the deletion request from another entity, and so on.
• A5: Whenever an automated deletion takes place by an entity Ee1, there should be a
corresponding event unregistere2,e3 that triggers the deletion delay, and also a corresponding
event registere2,e3 before that in Γ.
• A6: This rule says that whenever there is a collection of a personal data X˜, the parameters
related to the Purposes, Places, dd, TT, ByWhom, ToWhom, must be declared before the
collection to achieve transparency.
• A7: This rule captures the data minimisation requirement of data collection. Namely, the
purposes of the data collection should conform with the chosen services during registration.
The corresponding rule C1 in the policy level cannot be defined in the architecture level as
it requires a comparison with the element revdata in the policy level, which is not part of the
architecture. For similar reason, the rules C5, C8 cannot be defined in the architecture level as
they need comparison with elements in a policy.
Again, the PA compliancy property is relevant to verify if a specific system implementation
(e.g., protocol, system log procedure) complies with a given architecture. We let
A = {A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6, A7}
Trace rule-compliance relation: Let us denote by seqθ ≺rulearch Ai the fact that a given operation
trace seqθ ∈ SysImpOp(θ) of a system implementation SysImp, on a data of type θ, is in compliance
with a rule Ai ∈ A.
Definition 11 (trace piθ-compliance, seqθ ≺arch A)
An operation trace seqθ ∈ SysImpOp(θ) of a system implementation SysImp, on a data of type θ,
is in compliance with a DPR sub-policy piθ if it satisfies all the properties in A, ∀Ai ∈ A: seqθ
≺rulearch Ai. This is denoted by (seqθ ≺arch A).
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• A1: If {Collecte1,e2(X˜,Purposes), CConsente3,e4(X˜,Purposes)} ⊆ PA, then:
Γi = collecte1,e2(X˜ : D,Purposes, t) =⇒ ∃ k | ∃ t′ | Γk = cconsente3,e4(X˜ :
D,Purposes, t′) ∧ (t′ < t), where Ee3 = Ee1 or Ee3 6= Ee1, Ee2 = Ee4 or Ee2 6= Ee4,
and OWNER(X˜) = Ee4.
• A2: If {Usebywhom(X˜,Purposes), UConsente1,e2(X˜,Purposes,ByWhom)} ⊆ PA,
then:
Γi = usebywhom(X˜ : D,Purposes, t) =⇒ ∃ k | ∃ t′ | Γk = uconsente1,e2(X˜ :
D,Purposes,ByWhom, t′)∧ (t′ < t), where bywhom ⊆ ByWhom, and OWNER(X˜) =
Ee2.
• A3: If {Forwarde1,towhom(X˜,Purposes), FWconsente2,e3(X˜,Purposes,ToWhom)} ⊆
PA, then:
Γi = forwarde1,towhom(X˜ : D,Purposes, t) =⇒ ∃ k | ∃ t′ | Γk = fwconsente2,e3(X˜ :
D,Purposes,ToWhom, t′) ∧ (t′ < t), where towhom ⊆ ToWhom, and OWNER(X˜) =
Ee3, and either Ee1 = Ee2 or Ee1 6= Ee2.
• A4: If {ManDeletee1(X˜,Places, dd), DeleteReqe2,e1(X˜)} ⊆ PA, then:
Γi = mandeletee1(X˜ : D,Places, dd, t) =⇒ ∃ k | ∃ t′ |∃ DEL = {deletereqei,ej (X˜ :
D, tn)} | Γk = deletereqe2,e1(X˜ : D, t′) ∧ (deletereqe2,e1(X˜ : D, t′) ∈ DEL) ∧ (t′ < t)
∧ (t - t′ ≤ dd).
• A5: If {AutDeletee1(X˜,Places, dd), UnRegistere2,e3(pservices, typeserv),
Registere2,e3(pservices, typeserv)} ⊆ PA, then:
Γi = autdeletee1(X˜ : D,Places, dd, t) =⇒ ∃ k | ∃ t′ | ∃ t′′ | Γk =
unregistere2,e3(pservices, typeserv, t′) ∧ registere2,e3(pservices, typeserv, t′′) ∧ (t′′ <
t′ < t) ∧ (t− t′ < dd).
• A6: If {Collecte1,e2(X˜,Purposes), Declaree3,e4(X˜,DeclParam)} ⊆ PA, then:
Γi = collecte1,e2(X˜ : D,Purposes, t) =⇒ ∃ k | ∃ t′ | Γk = declaree3,e4(X˜ :
D,DeclParam, t′) ∧ (t′ < t), where Ee3 = Ee1 or Ee3 6= Ee1, Ee2 = Ee4 or Ee2 6=
Ee4, and OWNER(X˜) = Ee4.
• A7: If {Registere1,e2(pservices, typeserv, t),Collecte3,e4(X˜,Purposes)} ⊆ PA, then:
Γi = registere1,e2(pservices, typeserv, t) =⇒ ∃ k | ∃ t′ | Γk = collecte3,e1(X˜ :
D,Purposes, t′) ∧ Purposes ⊆ pservices ∧ TYPE(X˜) ∈ typeserv ∧ (t′ < t), and
either Ee2 = Ee3 or Ee2 6= Ee3.
Figure 9: DPR trace compliance rules in architectures.
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Definition 12 (system piθ-compliance, SysImp ≺sysarch A)
A system implementation SysImp is compliant with a DPR sub-policy piθ if ∀seqθ ∈ SysImpOp(θ):
seqθ ≺arch A. We denote this by (SysImp ≺sysarch A).
Definition 13 (system PA-compliance, SysImp |=arch PA)
A system implementation SysImp is in compliance with an architecture PA if
∀ seqθ ∈ SysImpOp(θ), and ∀θ ∈ TYPESPPA: we have seqθ ≺arch A. This is denoted by (SysImp
|=arch PA).
7 The Conformance Between Policies and Architectures
We distinguish three types of conformance: (i) privacy conformance, (ii) conformance with regards
to the data protection regulation, and (iii) functional conformance. Privacy conformance compares
the policies and the architectures based on privacy properties, namely, if at the policy level (based
on a defined policy) an entity never have a given data, then this is also true in the corresponding
architecture, and vice versa. The conformance with regards to the data protection regulation
deals with data protection requirements, such as consent collection, deletion/retention delay, as
well as data storage for a given data. Finally, functional conformance compares the policies and
the architectures based on which entities at the policy level and their corresponding entities at the
architecture level have the same data type.
In the following definition, we recall the notion of the low-level system implementations (SysImp
and SysImpOp) outlined in the Definition 4.
Definition 14 (DPR conformance between PL and PA) We say that an architecture PA
is in DPR conformance with a given policy PL, denoted by PA .dpr PL, if for all system imple-
mentations SysImp and their SysImpOp, and ∀θ ∈ TYPESPPL and the same θ ∈ TYPESPPA:
1. whenever ∃seqθ ∈ SysImpOp(θ) such that seqθ ≺rulepol Ci, where Ci ∈ C \ {C1, C5, C8}, then
∃Aj ∈ A, such that seqθ ≺rulearch Aj, and
(a) Storereve(X|θ, Places, TT) ∈ PA ∧ TT ∈ piθ.pistr.revdate; and
(b) Usebywhom(X|θ, Purposes) ∈ PA ∧ Purposes ⊆ piθ.piuse.upurp.purpsetu and bywhom
⊆ piθ.piuse.whouse.who; and
(c) Forwarde,towhom(X|θ, Purposes) ∈ PA ∧ Purposes ⊆ piθ.pifw.fwpurp ∧ towhom ⊆ piθ.pifw.3rdparty,
(d) If seqθ ≺rulepol C2, then seqparθ ≺rulearch A6, where seqparθ is the same as seqθ, but the action in
seqparθ corresponding to the event declaree3,e4(X˜:D, DeclParam, t′) in A6 does not have
the following parameters in the set DeclParam: pistr.ho.declparam1, pistr.wh.declparam2,
and pidel.how.declparam3 (where declparam1 ∈ {hidden, nohidden},declparam2 ∈ {sploc,
clientloc}, declparam3 = {p1, p2} as defined in the Section 5.1).
The Definition 14 says that for a low-level implementation whenever an operation trace seqθ on
the data type θ satisfies a policy compliance rule, then it also satisfies a corresponding architecture
compliance rule. The reason behind not taking into account the rules C1A, C5, and C8 is because
there is no corresponding architecture rule in A. Instead, to fullfil C1 we have the point 1./(a),
for C5 we have 1./(b), and for C8 we have 1./(c). Finally, 1./(d) is related to the fulfillment
of the rules C2 and A6, however, since the architecture does not contains information about the
values pistr.ho.declparam1, pistr.wh.declparam2, and pidel.how.declparam3, we remove them in the
set DeclParam in case of A6 in the actions in seqθ. Basically, here we allow a “weak” conformance
that tolerates the difference between the declared parameters for transparency.
27
7.1 Mapping Between the Policy Level and the Architecture Level
We provide a mapping between the policy level to the architecture level, and some formal properties
of the mapping.
Syntax Mapping: The set of entities in the policy level can be mapped to the set of entities in
the architecture as follows:
Definition 15 (Entity mapping)
For a given service provider system SP , let EntitySPPL and EntitySPAP be the set of defined entities
in the policy and architecture, respectively. We define a mapping function M that maps an e, e ∈
EntitySPPL, to a corresponding Ee, Ee ∈ EntitySPPA.
M: e ↔M Ee, (i.e., M(e) = Ee, and M(Ee) = e).
MS: {e1,. . . , em} ↔MS {Ee1 ,. . . , Eem}, where {e1,. . . , em} ⊆ EntitySPPL, and {Ee1 ,. . . , Eem} ⊆
EntitySPPA.
Then, we define the data mapping relation between the policy level and the architecture level
as follows:
Definition 16 (Data mapping)
Let DataPL and DataAP be the set of the defined data in the policy level and architecture level,
respectively. We define a mapping function D that maps a data dt|θ , dt|θ ∈ DataPL, to a corre-
sponding X|θ , X|θ ∈ DataPA.
D: dt|θ ↔D X|θ .
Finally, the following two definitions provide a strict and a loose mapping relation between the
policy and the corresponding architecture.
Definition 17 (Strict-mapping between policies and architectures) Let us consider the
policy PL and the architecture PA. We say that there is a strict-mapping between PL and PA,
denoted by PA →Cstrict PL, if ServicesSPPL ⊆ ServicesSPPA, and for each piθ ∈ PL, we have:
1. If ∃ piθ.picol, where picol.cons = Y, and picol.cpurp.decl = Y then
• ∃ X|θ ∈ DataPA, ∃ Ee1, Ee3, Ee3′ ∈ PartOf(Esp), where Ee1 = Ee3 or Ee1 6= Ee3,
OWNER(X|θ) = Ee4, Ee3 = Ee3′ or Ee3′ 6= Ee3 and
• {Collecte1,e2(X|θ , CPurposes), CConsente3,e4(X|θ , CPurposes),
Declaree3′,e4(X|θ , DeclParam)} ⊆ PA such that CPurposes ⊆ DeclParam, and CPur-
poses ∈ picol.cpurp.purpsetc.
2. If ∃ piθ.piuse, where piuse.cons = Y, and piuse.upurp.decl = Y, and
piuse.whouse.decl = Y then
• ∃X|θ , ∃Ee1, Ee1′ ∈ PartOf(Esp), Ee1 = Ee1′ or Ee1′ 6= Ee1, OWNER(X|θ) = Ee2 and
• {Usebywhom(X|θ , UPurposes), UConsente1,e2(X|θ , UPurposes, ByWhom), Declaree1′,e2(X|θ ,
DeclParam)} ⊆ PA such that UPurposes ∪ ByWhom ⊆ DeclParam, and UPurposes ∈
picol.upurp.purpsetu, and ByWhom ⊆ piuse.whouse.
3. If ∃ piθ.pistr, and
(a) pistr.wh = (clientloc, places, Y) then ∃ X|θ , ∃Ee /∈ PartOf(Esp), ∃E′e ∈ PartOf(Esp) and
{Storee(X|θ , Places), Declaree′,e(X|θ , DeclParam)} ⊆ PA, where Places ⊆ DeclParam.
(b) pistr.wh = (sploc, places, Y) and pistr.ho = (nohidden, Y) then ∃X|θ , ∃Ee1, Ee2 ∈
PartOf(Esp), ∃Ee3 /∈ PartOf(Esp), OWNER(X|θ) = Ee3, and {Storee1(X|θ , Places),
Declaree2,e3(X|θ , DeclParam)} ⊆ PA, where Places ⊆ DeclParam, and Places ⊆ places.
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(c) pistr.wh = (sploc, places, Y) and pistr.ho = (nohidden, Y) then
• ∃X|θ , ∃Ee1, Ee2 ∈ PartOf(Esp), where Ee1 = Ee2 or Ee1 6= Ee2 and
• {Storee1(X|θ , Places), Computee2(X˜ = F(X|θ ))} ⊆ PA, where Places ⊆ places and
• ∃ X˜1, . . . , X˜n, G : BackgroundDeductione3(G(F (X|θ ), X˜1, . . . , X˜n)→ X|θ ) ∧PA `∃t
HASe3
(
X˜1, t
) ∧ . . . ∧ HASe3 (X˜n, t), where Ee3 ∈ PartOf(Esp), and Ee3 and
Ee1 or Ee2 can be the same.
(d) pistr.wh = (sploc, places, Y) and pistr.ho = (hidden, Y) then
• ∃X|θ , ∃Ee1, Ee2 ∈ PartOf(Esp), where Ee1 = Ee2 or Ee1 6= Ee2 and
• {Storee1(X|θ , Places), Declaree2,e3(X|θ , DeclParam)} ⊆ PA, where where Places
⊆ DeclParam, and Places ⊆ places, OWNER(X|θ) = Ee3
(e) pistr.wh = (sploc, places, Y) and pistr.ho = (hidden, Y) then
• ∃X|θ , ∃Ee1, Ee2 ∈ PartOf(Esp), where Ee1 = Ee2 or Ee1 6= Ee2 and
• {Storee1(X|θ , Places), Computee2(X˜ = F(X|θ ))} ⊆ PA, where Places ⊆ places,
and
• @ X˜1, . . . , X˜n, G : BackgroundDeductione3(G(F (X|θ ), X˜1, . . . , X˜n)→ X|θ ) ∧PA `∃t
HASe3
(
X˜1, t
) ∧ . . . ∧ HASe3 (X˜n, t), where Ee3 ∈ PartOf(Esp), and Ee3 and
Ee1 or Ee2 can be the same.
(f) pistr.storerev = ([t1, t2 ], places, Y) then ∃X|θ , ∃Ee1, Ee2 ∈ PartOf(Esp), OWNER(X|θ)
= Ee3 and {Storereve1(X|θ , PL, TT), Declaree2,e3(X|θ , DeclParam)} ⊆ PA, where PL
⊆ DeclParam, and (PL = places) and (t1 ≤ TT ≤ t2).
4. If ∃ piθ.pidel, and
(a) pidel.how = (man, full, Y) and pidel.deld = (dd, decl) then ∃ X|θ : {DeleteReqe1,e2(X|θ ),
ManDeletee2(X|θ , {EMainsp , EBckUpsp}, dd), Declaree3,e4(X|θ , DeclParam)} ⊆ PA,
where {EMainsp , EBckUpsp , dd} ⊆ DeclParam.
(b) pidel.how = (man, partly, Y) and pidel.deld = (dd, decl) then ∃ X|θ : {DeleteReqe1,e2(X|θ ),
ManDeletee2(X|θ , {EMainsp}, dd), Declaree3,e4(X|θ , DeclParam)} ⊆ PA, where {EMainsp ,
dd} ⊆ DeclParam.
(c) pidel.how = (aut, full, Y) and pidel.gdeld = ((activity, gd), Y) then ∃ X|θ : {Unregistere2,e3(pservices,
typeserv), AutDeletee1(X|θ , {EMainsp , EBckUpsp}, gd), Declaree3,e4(X|θ , DeclParam)}
⊆ PA, where {EMainsp , EBckUpsp , gd} ⊆ DeclParam.
(d) pidel.how = (aut, partly, Y) and pidel.gdeld = (gd, Y) then ∃ X|θ :
{Unregistere2,e3(pservices, typeserv), AutDeletee1(X|θ , {EMainsp}, gd), Declaree3,e4(X|θ ,
DeclParam)} ⊆ PA, where {EMainsp , gd} ⊆ DeclParam.
5. If ∃ piθ.pifw, and pifw = (Y, fwpurp, 3rdparty) then ∃X|θ :
{Forwarde1,towhom(X|θ , Purposes), FwConsente2,e3(X|θ , Purposes, ToWhom), Declaree3,e4(X|θ ,
DeclParam)} ⊆ PA, where {Purposes, ToWhom} ⊆ DeclParam, Purposes ⊆ pifw.fwpurp,
and ToWhom ⊆ pifw.3rdparty.
where for the types and entities in the points above, we have the following assumptions:
• each θ ∈ TYPESPPL is the same as each θ ∈ TYPESPPA.
• ∃ M: sp ↔M Esp, e ↔M Ee, e′ ↔M Ee′ , e1 ↔M Ee1, e1′ ↔M Ee1′ , e2 ↔M Ee2, e3 ↔M Ee3,
e3′ ↔M Ee3′ , e4 ↔M Ee4.
Definition 18 (Loose-mapping between policies and architectures) Let us consider the
policy PL and the architecture PA. We say that there is a loose-mapping between PL and PA,
denoted by PA →Cloose PL, if it fulfills all the requirements in the Definition 17, except for the
points 3/(c), 3/(d), and 3/(e).
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The loose-mapping is lenient with regards to the form a data is stored. The intuition behind
this is that although making the content of the collected data avaiable to a service provider is not
perfect from privacy perspectives, it does not always violate the data protection regulations as
sometimes a service provider needs to know the data content to ba able to provide the service or
for accountability purposes. To conform with the data protection regulations, a service provider
can still protect the data by encrypting it with its own key.
7.2 Conformances between policies and architectures
As mentioned before, we distinguish three types of conformance: (i) privacy conformance, (ii)
conformance with regards to the data protection regulation (DPR), and (iii) functional confor-
mance. In the rest of the paper, we refer to the second case as DPR conformance. Further, we
also distinguish between strong and weak DPR conformances.
Definition 19 (Privacy conformance) Let a policy PL = {piθ1 , . . . , piθm} defined in the policy
language PDC , and an architecture PA in the architecture language ADC . Further, let PartOf be
a function defined on EntitySPPA. We say that PA conforms with PL with regards to the privacy
property, denoted by PA .priv PL:
If for a given e and dt|θ , where θ ∈ {θ1, . . . , θm}, e ∈ EntitySPPL and dt|θ ∈ DataSPPL, we have
that if [e ¬has dt|θ ]PL, then
1. ∃ M, D: e ↔M Ee, and dt|θ ↔D X|θ , such that PA ` HASnevere
(
X|θ
)
; and
2. ∀ Ei ∈ EntityPA, Ei 6= Ee: PartOf(Ee) = Ei, then PA ` HASneveri
(
X|θ
)
.
Proposition 1 (DPR conformance - Strict mapping)
Given a policy PL = {piθ1 , . . . , piθm} defined in the policy language PDC , and an architecture PA
in the architecture language ADC . PA strongly DPR conforms with PL, PA .dpr PL, if for each
piθ ∈ PL, ∃ Cstrict: PA →Cstrict PL.
Proof: Following the Definition 14, let SysImp be a system implementation, and let SysImpOp(θ)
be the system operation with a data dt of type θ (dt|θ). We will show that if ∃ Cstrict: PA →Cstrict
PL holds, then the Definition 14 is fulfilled.
Due to the strict mapping properties in the Definition 17, whenever SysImpOp(θ) fulfils the
rule A1 in the Fig. 9 it also fulfils the rule C3 in the Fig. 2. Similarly, whenever SysImpOp(θ)
satisfies A2, A3, A4, A5, A6, A7, it also satisfies the corresponding rules C4, C9, C6, C7, C2, and
C10, respectively. These come from the assumptions made in the Definition 17, on the parameter
sets such as purposes, towhom, bywhom, etc. Further, point 2 of the Definition 14 is satisfied
because of the point 3/(e) of the Definition 17. Point 3 of the Definition 14 is satisfied because
of the point 2 of the Definition 17. Finally, point 4 of the Definition 14 is satisfied because of the
point 5 of the Definition 17. 
Proposition 2 (DPR conformance - Loose mapping)
Given a policy PL = {piθ1 , . . . , piθm} defined in the policy language PDC , and an architecture PA
in the architecture language ADC . PA DPR conforms with PL, PA .dpr PL, if for each piθ ∈
PL, ∃ Cloose: PA →Cloose PL.
Proof: The proof is similar to the previous proposition. This proposition says that to achieve
DPR conformance, it is enough to satisfy the loose mapping requirements without requiring per-
sonal data always being stored hidden from the service provider. 
Definition 20 (Functional conformance) Given a policy PL = {piθ1 , . . . , piθm} defined in the
policy language PDC , and an architecture PA in the architecture language ADC . We say that PA
conforms with PL with regards to functionality, denoted by PA .func PL, we have:
If for a given e and dt|θ such that e ∈ EntitySPPL and dt|θ ∈ DataSPPL, we have [e has dt|θ ]PL,
then for the corresponding Ee and X|θ in the architecture level (∃ M, D: e ↔M Ee, and dt|θ ↔D
X|θ ), we have PA `∃t HASe
(
X|θ , t
)
.
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8 Case Study: A Privacy Policy and Architecture for a
Smart Metering Service
The following is an excerpt from the ICO guideline [17] on personal data:
Definition 21 A data can be seen as a personal data if it satisfies some of the following points:
1. “A living individual can be identified from the data, or, from the data and other information
in your possession, or likely to come into your possession”, and
2. “the data ‘relates to’ the identifiable living individual, whether in personal or family life,
business or profession”, or
3. “the data is used, or is it to be used, to inform or influence actions or decisions affecting an
identifiable individual”
8.1 Policy Level
Let denote the service provider by SP referring to an energy service provider, and let the set of
services it provides be:
PServicesSPPL = {reg (registration),
ecr (energy consumption reading),
cds (consumption data storage),
ecn (energy consumption notification),
bc (balance calculation),
bn (balance notification),
bil (billing)}
ref (refund)}.
The corresponding set of supported data types are:
TYPESPPL = {θpi, θec, θbal, θbill, θdshideec , θdshidebal }
where θpi = personal info (which covers the information required at the registration phase e.g.,
names, phone number, address, birth date, etc.), θec = energy consumption reading, and θbal =
balance, θbill = type fill the bills.
Type for data hidden from the service provider : For each type θ, we define its corresponding
data type θdshide. The service provider will not be able to link a data of this type with any
involved data subject in it, namely, the ID of a data subject is hidden from the service provider.
For instance, θdshideec is the type of an energy consumption reading in which the information about
the related customer is hidden from the service provider (the content of the reading is available,
but the (real) identity of the data subject not). Of course, for some data type such as personal
information giving at the registration phase, the data subject should not be hidden. Finally, bills
should also be available to the service provider for accountability purposes, e.g., in case of dispute.
Based on the set of supported data types, the privacy policy defined for SP is as follows:
PL = {piθpi , piθec , piθbal , piθbill , piθdshideec , piθdshidebal }
The system is composed of three categories of entities: the service provider, customers, and
the authority (as a third-party organisation) to whom the service provider forward the data in
case of any criminal offence or dispute. Hence
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EntitySPPL = {sp, cust, auth}
For the policies piθec , piθbal , data collection, storage, usage, deletion and forwarding are not
allowed (NAD), namely:
piθec = piθbal = (NAD, NAD, NAD, NAD, NAD)
8.1.1 Personal information
For personal information, piθpi , we have
piθpi = (picol, piuse, pistr, pidel,
pifw)
with the following sub-policies:
1. For data collection policy, piθpi .picol, we have
• cons = Y , based on the GDPR, a consent is required when collecting personal data.
• cpurp.purpsetc = {reg}, meaning that the personal info is collected for registration
purposes.
• cpurp.decl = Y , meaning that the collection purposes are declared towards the cus-
tomers, and available to them (transparency).
2. For data usage policy, piθpi .piuse, we have
• cons = Y
• cpurp.purpsetu = {ecr, gcr, bil}, meaning that the personal info is used for electricity,
gas consumption reading, notification and billing purposes.
• cpurp.decl = Y .
3. For data storage policy, piθpi .pistr, we have
• wh = (sploc, {Main, BckUp}, Y ), meaning that the personal info is stored at the service
provider’s (EN ) site, both in the main and backup storage places. This has been also
declared to the customers (data subject).
• ho = (hidden, Y ), meaning that the personal information is stored hidden from the
service provider (unknown to service provider), and this information should be declared
to the customers.
• revdate = ([t1, t2], {Main, BckUp}, Y ), where t1 = txcol + n × 2 years, where n=1,
2,. . . , and t2 = t1 + 1 month. Namely, the review period for the need of storing personal
info, in both the main and backup servers, is after each 2 years from the first storing
time, and should be carried out within 1 month. txcol is a time variable capturing the
time that a personal info is collected for the first time.
4. For data deletion policy, piθpi .pidel, we have
• how = ((aut, full), (man, (partly, {bil, ref })), Y ). Namely, the policy defines both
automated and fully as well as manual and partly deletion modes for personal info
carried out by the service provider, and this fact is declared for the customer. In the
manual mode, the customers can request deletion of their personal info when they
initiate the request (e.g., by clicking on delete button) from the services, however, the
policy says that the deletion request by the customer only takes place from the main
servers, but not from the backup places for billing and refunding reasons. The personal
info will only be deleted fully from the backup places when it is no longer necessary for
any service purposes.
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• deld = (1m, Y ) represents the delay for the deletion after the customer initiates the
request. The personal info must be deleted from the main servers within 1 minute from
the request.
• gdeld = ({storerev, DF}, Y ). After a review of the necessity of storage, the personal
info will be fully deleted from the backup places after a defined but not numerical delay.
5. For data forwarding, piθpi .pifw, we have
• (Y , {bil, ref }, {auth}), in case of dispute/offence on billing, the personal info of the
particular customer is forwarded to the authority for billing (clarification) purposes.
Again, consent should be collected.
8.1.2 Energy Bills
For the bills, piθbill , we have
piθbill = (piuse, pistr, pidel, pifw)
There is no collection policy for piθbill because a bill is calculated instead of collected. However,
it can be seen as a personal data since it shows the amount a related customer should pay, hence
let defines its sub-policies as follows:
1. For data usage, piθbill .piuse we have
• cons = Y , consent is required for bills as they are personal data. Bills usually contain
the customer’s name, address and consumption info.
• cpurp.purpsetu = {bil}
• cpurp.decl = Y .
2. For data storage, piθbill .pistr we have
• wh = (sploc, {Main, BckUp}, Y ).
• ho = (unhidden, Y ). The bills are stored at the service provider’s site, unhidden from
the service provider (e.g., encrypted with a key available to the service provider).
• revdate = ([t1, t2], {Main, BckUp}, Y ), where t1 = txstr + n × 2 years, where n=1,
2,. . . , and t2 = t1 + 1 month. Namely, the review period for the need of storing bills is
after each 2 years from the first storing time, and should be carried out within 1 month.
txstr is a time variable capturing the time that a bill is stored for the first time.
3. For data deletion, piθbill .pidel, we have
• how = ((aut, full), (man, (partly, {bil, ref })), Y ).
• deld = (1 min, Y ). When a customer unregisters from the system the bills are deleted
from the main servers but not from the backup servers.
• gdeld = ({unregister, DF}, Y ). The bills are kept by the service provider in its backup
servers until they are required for the services (i.e., there is defined delay (DF) but not
a numerical value).
4. For data forwarding, piθbill .pifw we have
• (Y , {bil, ref }, {auth}). Bills are forwarded to the authority in case of dispute for billing
or refunding purposes.
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8.1.3 Hidden Energy Consumption Readings
The hidden energy consumption reading data have the same policy, hence for pidshideθec , we have
piθdshideec = (picol, piuse, pistr, pidel, pifw)
where, because the data subject is hidden/unlinkable with the readings, the sub-policies are:
1. For data collection, piθdshideec .picol, we have
• cons = N , because it’s not a personal data.
• cpurp.purpsetc = {ecn, cds, bc, bil}, meaning that the consumption data is collected
for notification, storage, balance calculation and billing purposes.
• cpurp.decl = Y .
2. For data usage, piθdshideec .piuse, we have
• cons = N
• cpurp.purpsetu = {ecn, bc, bil}.
• cpurp.decl = Y .
3. For data storage, piθdshideec .pistr, we have
• wh = (sploc, {Main, BckUp}, Y ).
• ho = (unhidden, Y ). The content of the reading is available to the service provider (but
not the data subject).
• revdate = ([t1, t2], {Main, BckUp}, Y ), where t1 and t2 are similar as in piθpi .
4. For data deletion, piθdshideec .pidel, we have
• how = ((aut, full), (man, (partly, {bil, ref })), Y ).
• deld = (1 min, Y ). After a customer initiates a deletion request, the reading will be
deleted from the main server of the service provider within 1 minute, but not from the
backup server.
• gdeld = ({unregister, DF}, Y ). The deletion from the back up server is defined (DF),
but again, it is not a numerical value.
5. For data forwarding, piθdshideec .pifw, we have
• (Y , {bil, ref }, {auth}). Consent is still required for this when forwarded to the authority
as the authority will be able to link the (real) customer with the reading, in case of
dispute.
8.1.4 Hidden Temporary Balance
For a temporary balance, piθdshide
bal
, we have
piθdshide
bal
= (piuse, pistr, pidel, pifw)
Again, there is no collection policy for piθdshide
bal
because a temporary balance is calculated.
Further, it is not a personal data since the link between data subject and balance is hidden from
the service provider, hence:
1. For data usage, piθdshide
bal
.piuse, we have
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• cons = N .
• cpurp.purpsetu = {bn}, meaning that the usage purpose is notifying the customer about
the current balance.
• cpurp.decl = Y .
2. For data storage, piθdshide
bal
.pistr, we have
• wh = (sploc, {Main, BckUp}, Y ).
• ho = (unhidden, Y ). The temporary balances are stored at the service provider’s site,
encrypted with the service provider’s key.
• revdate = ([t1, t2], {Main, BckUp}, Y ), where t1 and t2 are similar as in piθpi .
3. For data deletion, piθdshide
bal
.pidel, we have
• how = ({(aut, full)})}, Y ). The service provider keeps these temporary balances for
notification purpose whenever the customer download them.
• gdeld = ({unregister, 1 day}, Y ). Once the customers unregister themselves, they do
not need to download these pieces of data anymore, hence the service provider deletes
them within a short time period, e.g., 1 day.
4. For data forwarding, piθdshide
bal
.pifw, we have piθdshide
bal
.pifw = NAD.
• A temporary consumption balance is not allowed to be forwarded to any third-party
organisation. This is only for notifying a user about their curent consumption to help
them save money. In case of dispute, the authority will use the forwarded bills and
energy consumption readings for verification purposes.
8.2 The Architecture Level and Conformance Checks
Let us consider an example architectures on which we will demonstrate the specification based on
the proposed language, as well as carry out a conformance checks against the policy above.
8.2.1 Architecture
The architecture (PA1) is formally defined as follows:
1. Let EntitySPPA1 = {Ecsp, Em, Ep, EMainsp , EBckUpsp , Ecust, Eauth, Esp}, where PartOf (Esp)
= {Ecsp, Em, Ep, EMainsp , EBckUpsp}. This says that Ecsp, Em, Ep, EMainsp , and EBckUpsp
are parts of the service provider Esp. Ecsp represents central server of the service provider,
Em represents a smart meter installed at the customers premises, and Ep the tablet/panel
used by the customer to keep track of the consumption, and get notifications. EMainsp
and EBckUpsp represent the main and backup servers of the service provider, while Ecust
and Eauth the customer and the authority, respectively. The architecture is depicted in the
Fig 10.
2. Let PservicesSPPA1 = Pservices
SP
PL1 .
3. Let TYPESPPA1 = {θpi, θec, θbal, θbill, θCkey, θSkey, θSAkey, θtariff, θecSkey, θpiSkey, θpiSAkey,
θbalSAkey, θbillSAkey}, where the first four types are the same as the first four types in
TYPESPPL. The following θCkey, θSkey and θSAkey are the types of the customer keys, the
server keys and the shared keys between the CSP server and the authority’s server. θtariff
is the type of the current tariff for calculation the current balance. Finally, θecSkey, θpiSkey,
θpiSAkey, θbalSAkey and θbillSAkey are the types of the energy reading, personal information,
balance and bill encrypted with the data of types θSkey, θSkey, θSAkey, θSAkey and θSAkey,
respectively.
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Figure 10: The architecture of the first example smart meter system. We assume a long-term
customer ID (cust), which is valid throughout the service. The arrows capture the communication
and direction of message exchange between entities, while the numbers on the arrows and the
boxes represent the corresponding activities in the Fig. 11.
A customer is assigned a long-term ID (cust), and this is shared with the service provider. The
smart meter (Em) regularly sends the energy consumption readings to the central server (Ecsp).
Based on this information, the central server calculates the temporary balance and then sends it
to the panel for notifying the customer. A monthly bill will be issued for the customer at the end.
Let the set of services provided by the architecture, PServicesSPPA, is the same as the services
defined in the policy, PServicesSPPL: PServicesSPPA = PServicesSPPL. Formally, PA1 is defined by the
set of activities in the Fig. 11.
The following conformances properties hold between the architecture the policy:
Property 5 (Privacy conformance) The architecture PA1 does not privacy conform with the
policy PL, namely, PA1 7priv PL.
Proof: Let the mapping M be as follows: sp ↔M Esp, cust ↔M Ecust, auth ↔M Eauth. In the
policy, we have piθec = piθbal = (NAD, NAD, NAD, NAD, NAD), which means that the service
provider is not allowed to collect, use, store, delete or forward any energy comsumption reading,
and any temporary balance. Hence, we have [e ¬has dt|θec ]PL.
However, in the architecture, based on the rule H5 in the Fig. 7 and the row 5. in the Fig. 11
as well as the destructor in the Fig. 12, we have PA `∃t HAScsp
(
X|
θecSAkey
, t
)
. Further, since Esp
∈ PartOf (Esp), based on the rule H15 in the Fig. 7, we also have PA `∃t HASsp
(
X|
θecSAkey
, t
)
.
Then, following this and the rule H7 (Fig. 7), we have PA `∃t HASsp
(
X|
θec
, t
)
. Similarly, for
piθbal , we have PA `∃t HASsp
(
X|
θbal
, t
)
based on the rule H5 in the Fig. 7 and the row 7. in the
Fig. 11. 
Property 6 (DPR conformance) The architecture PA1 is not in DPR conformance with the
policy PL, namely, PA1 7dpr PL.
Proof: It is easy to see that the point 1./(d) of the Definition 14 does not hold, as there was
no activity Declare defined in PA1. Interestingly, there is not any mapping Cstrict such that PA
→Cstrict PL. This is because of the violation of the point 3/d of the Definition 17, since for a data
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PASP ::= {1/a. Owncust(X|θpi), 1/b. Owncust(X|θCkey ), 1/c. Owncsp(X|θSkey ),
1/d. Ownm(X|θSkey ), 1/e. Ownp(X|θSkey ), 1/f. Ownauth(X|θSAkey ),
1/g. Owncsp(X|θSAkey ), 1/h. Owncsp(X|θtariff), 1/i. Ownm(X|θec),
2. Registercust,p(pservices, typeserv), where pservices ⊆ PServicesSPPA,
3. Computem(X|θecSkey = Enc(X|θec , X|θSkey )),
4. Computep(X|θpiSkey = Enc(X|θpi , X|θSkey )),
5. Computecsp(X|θecSAkey = Enc(X|θec , X|θSAkey )),
6. Computecsp(X|θpiSAkey = Enc(X|θpi , X|θSAkey )),
7. Computecsp(X|θbal = Bal(X|θec , X|θtariff)),
8. Computecsp(X|θbalSAkey = Enc(X|θbal , X|θSAkey )),
9. Computecsp(X|θbill = Bill(X|θec , X|θtariff)),
10. Computecsp(X|θbillSAkey = Enc(X|θbill , X|θSAkey )),
11. Computecsp(X|θbillSkey = Enc(X|θbill , X|θSkey )),
12. Store{Mainsp,BckUpsp}(X|θecSkey ),
13. Store{Mainsp,BckUpsp}(X|θpiSkey ),
14. Storerevcsp(X|θecSkey , {EMainsp , EBckUpsp}, tt),
15. Storerevcsp(X|θpiSkey , {EMainsp , EBckUpsp}, tt),
16. Collectp,cust(X|θpi , Purposes), Purposes = {reg},
17. CConsentp,cust(X|θpi , Purposes), Purposes = {reg},
18/a. Usecsp(X|θpi , Purposes), Purposes = {ecr, gcr, bil},
18/b. Usecsp(X|θbill , Purposes), Purposes = {ecr, gcr, bil},
19. UConsentp,cust(X|θpi , Purposes, {Esp}), Purposes = {ecr, gcr, bil},
20. Forwardcsp,{auth}(X|θpiSAkey , Purposes), Purposes = {bil, ref },
21. Forwardcsp,{auth}(X|θecSAkey , Purposes), Purposes = {bil, ref },
22. Forwardcsp,{auth}(X|θbillSAkey , Purposes), Purposes = {bil, ref },
23. FwConsentp,cust(X|θpiSAkey , Purposes, {Eauth}), Purposes = {bil, ref },
24. FwConsentp,cust(X|θecSAkey , Purposes = {bil, ref },
25. FwConsentp,cust(X|θbillSAkey , Purposes, {Eauth}), Purposes = {bil, ref },
26. DeleteReqcust,p(X|θpiSkey ),
27. DeleteReqp,csp(X|θpiSkey ),
28. DeleteReqcsp,Mainsp(X|θpiSkey ),
29. DeleteReqcsp,BckUpsp(X|θpiSkey ),
30. DeleteReqcust,p(X|θecSkey ),
31. DeleteReqp,csp(X|θecSkey ),
32. DeleteReqcsp,Mainsp(X|θecSkey ),
33. DeleteReqcsp,BckUpsp(X|θecSkey ),
34/a. ManDeleteMainsp(X|θpiSkey , dd), 34/b. ManDeleteBckUpsp(X|θpiSkey , dd),
35/a. ManDeleteMainsp(X|θecSkey , dd), 35/b. ManDeleteBckUpsp(X|θecSkey , dd),
36/a. AutDeleteMainsp(X|θpiSkey , dd), 36/b. AutDeleteBckUpsp(X|θpiSkey , dd),
37/a. AutDeleteMainsp(X|θecSkey , dd), 37/b. AutDeleteBckUpsp(X|θecSkey , dd),
38. Receivep,csp(X|θbalSkey ),
39. Receivep,csp(X|θbillSkey ),
40. Receivep,m(X|θecSkey ),
41. Receivecust,p(X|θbill),
42. Receivecust,p(X|θec),
43. Receivecust,p(X|θbal).
44. ReceiveMainsp,csp(X|θecSkey ),
45. ReceiveBckUpsp,csp(X|θecSkey ).
46. ReceiveMainsp,csp(X|θpiSkey ),
47. ReceiveBckUpsp,csp(X|θpiSkey ).
48. Receivem,csp(X|θecSkey ),
49. Receivep,csp(X|θpiSkey ).}
Figure 11: The architecture defined in the proposed language syntax.37
Destructors for Esp:
Dest. Dec(Enc(X|θ, X|θkey ), X|θkey ) → X|θ
Figure 12: Destructor defined for tservice provider. It says that the service provider has the ability
decrypt the ciphertext using the right key.
of type θec the policy requires that it is stored hidden from (not available to) the service provider,
however, this is not the case in the architecture, as the service provider can decrypt the encrypted
energy readings using its own key.

Property 7 (Functional conformance) The architecture PA1 does not functionally conform
with the policy PL, namely, PA1 7func PL.
Proof: The proof of this property is similar to the Property 5. It can be shown that [e has
dt|
θdshideec
]PL, but PA ` HASnevere
(
X|
θdshideec
)
, hence, not satisfying the requirements set in the
Definition 20. 
9 Conclusion and Future Works
In this paper, we proposed a policy language and an architecture languages for specifying and
reasoning about data protection properties in the policy and architecture levels. We demonstrated
their expressive syntax and semantics by specifying a DPR policy and architecture for a smart
metering service as case study. Different variants of conformance relations between the defined
architecture and policy have been proved and refuted using our definitions, propositions and
inference rules.
This paper is one of the first works of its kind and we believe that in the near future we will
propose a software tool based on the initial theoretical results given in this paper, also extended
with automated reasoning algorithms. A further possibility is to extend and improve our previous
work on conformance check between architectures and system implementations [34] with DPR
properties. As a final result, we will be able to verify if a concrete system implementation conform
with the current data protection regulations. Finally, we also intend to extend our languages with
the dynamic data control sub-policies given in [33].
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